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THE POST-TRUTH FIRST AMENDMENT
SARAH C. HAAN*
Post-truthism is widely viewed as a political problem. This Article explores posttruthism as a constitutional law problem, and argues that, because post-truthism
offers a normative framework for regulating information, we should take it seriously
as a basis for law.
In its exploration of the influence of post-truth ideas on law, the Article focuses
on the compelled speech doctrine. When the State mandates disclosure, it pits the
interests of unwilling speakers against the interests of listeners. In the twenty-first
century, speakers who are targeted by mandatory disclosure laws are often
organizational actors with informational advantages, such as corporations.
Listeners who stand to benefit from information-forcing laws are mainly information
end users such as consumers, investors, and citizens. Often, compelled speech law
sets the ground rules for the political conflict between these Information Haves and
Information Have-Nots, where it becomes fertile ground for post-truth ideas.
The Article argues that post-truth ideas are particularly potent in courts’
application of the Zauderer doctrine, which governs a subset of disclosure laws. In a
common interpretation—one endorsed by the Supreme Court last term in NIFLA v.
Becerra—Zauderer provides lax scrutiny to laws that mandate disclosure of “purely
factual and uncontroversial” information. As a result, many courts deciding a
challenge to a disclosure law evaluate the “controversiality” of the information
subject to disclosure. In this approach, “controversial” information—a broad
category including information related to a public controversy or debate—enjoys
greater protection from information-forcing law than uncontroversial information
does. The Article argues that a legal framework that calibrates disclosure law to the
controversiality of the underlying information is paradigmatically post-truth. It
contends that, ultimately, by increasing protection of “controversial” information
from disclosure, the Zauderer doctrine contributes to a post-truth information
economy, in which the citizenry’s ability to engage in truth-seeking, self-fulfillment,
and self-government is constrained by its lack of legal authority to reduce
information asymmetries or to wrest information from Information Haves.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2018, a teenager killed seventeen people with an AR-15 rifle at a
Parkland, Florida high school, prompting calls for gun reform. 1 Soon afterward, an
aide to a Florida legislator publicly claimed, falsely, that two teen survivors who
appeared on CNN were not survivors of a real shooting but actors making it up.2 The
son of the President of the United States “liked” tweets making similar allegations,
and conspiracy theorists spread claims across the internet that the shooting was a
“false flag” operation intended to undermine gun rights.3 A video detailing the madeup conspiracy reached number one on YouTube’s trending page before the company
pulled it down; “political propaganda bots and Russia-linked Twitter accounts”
swarmed social media to foment discord about the shooting and the Second

1. Arian Campo-Flores & Nicole Hong, How the Florida School Shooting Turned Into
a Gun-Control Movement, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/how-the-florida-school-shooting-turned-into-a-gun-control-movement-1519416915
[https://perma.cc/E5TA-RAHX].
2. Christal Hayes, Florida Lawmaker’s Aide Fired After Falsely Claiming Parkland
Students Are Crisis ‘Actors’, USA TODAY (Feb. 20, 2018, 7:01 PM), https://www.usatoday
.com/story/news/2018/02/20/aide-florida-lawmaker-outspoken-survivors-florida-shooting
-crisis-actors/356960002/ [https://perma.cc/Q6DH-RZP3].
3. Michael M. Grynbaum, Right-Wing Media Uses Parkland Shooting as Conspiracy
Fodder, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/business
/media/parkland-shooting-media-conspiracy.html [https://perma.cc/U2HN-HMU9].
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Amendment.4 The refrain for this story is a familiar one: welcome to Post-Truth
America.
In the popular imagination, “post-truthism” is a political problem—it connotes
lying and deception for political gain.5 Climate change denialism is post-truth
because it contravenes the consensus views of climate scientists and advances the
Big Oil agenda. “Fake news” is post-truth because it seeds public debate with false
news stories to stoke fear and anger. In post-truth politics, politicians tell us things
that “‘feel true’ but have no basis in fact” to score political points. 6 The dangers of
post-truthism are political dangers—growing partisanship, a resurgence of extremist
ideologies, and the shadow of fascism. 7
What if post-truthism also poses dangers for constitutional law?
This Article argues that post-truthism offers a normative framework for regulating
information: a system of information values that ascribes low value to facts and factbased reasoning. It shows that this normative version of post-truthism is already
influencing First Amendment law. Post-truth threads, it argues, are brightly visible
in compelled speech law.8

4. Erin Griffith, Pro-Gun Russian Bots Flood Twitter After Parkland Shooting, WIRED
(Feb. 15, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/pro-gun-russian-bots-flood-twitter
-after-parkland-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/2L62-MJD6]; John Herrman, The Making of a No.
1 YouTube Conspiracy Video After the Parkland Tragedy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/21/business/media/youtube-conspiracy-video
-parkland.html [https://perma.cc/8JC6-6BGF].
5. See, e.g., Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, Truth Isn’t the Problem—We Are, WALL ST.
J. (Mar. 15, 2018, 10:36 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/truth-isnt-the-problemwe-are
-1521124562 [https://perma.cc/6JPP-DVEX] (defining post-truthism as the idea “that there is
something radically screwy going on in one specific domain, namely politics”).
6. Post-Truth Politics: Art of the Lie, ECONOMIST (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www
.economist.com/leaders/2016/09/10/art-of-the-lie [https://perma.cc/9LFE-A7QL].
7. A number of commentators have pointed out that post-truthism subverts “our capacity
to reach any sort of middle ground or consensus”—a key function of political discourse and
one that is necessary for the project of self-government. Goldstein, supra note 5.
8. Aside from a spate of scholarship on the regulation of false statements and United
States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012), the legal academic literature on post-truthism is thin.
On falsity and the First Amendment, see, for example, Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s
Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV. 445 (2012) and Frederick Schauer, Facts and the
First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897 (2010). For more recent scholarship that connects
post-truthism to law, see Joseph Blocher, Free Speech and Justified True Belief 7 (Duke Law
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Series No. 2019-6, Jan. 15, 2019), https://ssrn
.com/abstract=3315835 [https://perma.cc/UH4N-338T] (advocating a “knowledge-based
approach to free speech”); Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deepfakes and the New
Disinformation War: The Coming Age of Post-Truth Geopolitics, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb.
2019, at 147, 147–48 (exploring the use of “highly realistic and difficult-to-detect digital
manipulations of audio or video” as disinformation); Justin O’Brien, A Question of Trust:
Post-Truth Paradigms and the Challenge to Financial Regulation, 11 L. & FIN. MKTS. REV.
20 (2017) (exploring how the erosion of trust in institutions influences financial regulation
policies); Jennifer Raso, Accessible Information and Democratic Dissent: Who Counts?, 12
J.L. & EQUALITY 13 (2016) (considering the post-truth consequences of Canadian census
reforms); and S.I. Strong, Alternative Facts and the Post-Truth Society: Meeting the
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Why do we find such evidence in compelled speech law? Because of the political
stakes. Compelled speech presents to courts a unique political problem. When
government restricts speech, the interests of speakers and listeners are roughly
aligned; both speakers and listeners seek the production of speech. When government
mandates disclosure, however, it is because listeners seek information that speakers
do not want to produce.9
In compelled speech disputes in the United States, listener and speaker interest
groups increasingly are defined by their roles in market exchanges. On the listener
side, we mostly find individual information end users, such as consumers, retail
investors, citizens, and workers. On the speaker side, we mostly find large
organizations, often commercial actors. Thus, many compelled speech challenges
involve a political contest between weak information end users and moneyed—and
informationally advantaged—companies.10 In this setting, it is no great surprise to
find that post-truth disclosure cases both convey normative ideas about the sorts of
information that listeners should and should not use to make decisions and decide,
as a constitutional matter, what sorts of information listeners can have access to.
Compelled speech law exhibits post-truthism in at least two senses. First, some
compelled speech subdoctrines are regulating information flows with a keen eye to
the effects of a disclosure on its recipients’ reasoning. To do this, they sew analytical
connections between speaker interests and post-truth concerns about how people are
likely to—and should—use information. This Article focuses on the widespread use
by federal courts of “controversiality” tests to evaluate disclosure mandates under
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio11—an
approach recently endorsed by a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court in National
Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra.12 By unpacking the
Zauderer doctrine, the Article shows how post-truth values are shaping the margins
of First Amendment law.

Challenge, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137, 137 (2017) (“[Post-truth] creates a critical
conundrum for lawyers, judges, legislators, and anyone interested in deliberative
democracy.”). See also Robert Post, Truth and Disagreement, in TRUTH AND DEMOCRACY 76,
85 (Jeremy Elkins & Andrew Norris eds., 2012) (“Truth in law is decisive and singular rather
than plural and evolving. Truth in law is thus the opposite of truth in politics.”); Brian C.
Murchison, Speech and the Truth-Seeking Value, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 55, 65 (2015)
(arguing that courts should make the truth-seeking value a “more explicit and careful part” of
their analysis).
9. See Helen Norton, Secrets, Lies, and Disclosure, 27 J.L. & POL. 641, 648 (2012)
(urging attention in First Amendment cases to “whether the speakers’ reason for resisting”
mandatory disclosure “undermines listener autonomy”).
10. Accord Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1119,
1120 (2015) (approving and expanding upon the view that the contemporary First Amendment
“shelters power’s ability to make and propagate its own truth”). For a discussion of the tensions
that exist between speakers’ rights and listeners’ rights in speech disputes, see Leslie Kendrick,
Are Speech Rights for Speakers?, 103 VA. L. REV. 1767 (2017).
11. 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
12. 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018).
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Compelled speech law also works, in conjunction with market forces, to create a
post-truth information economy. In a post-truth information economy, it is difficult
and costly, and sometimes impossible, for information end users to learn information
that sheds light on matters of private or public concern. In the absence of such
information, end users must still make decisions—perhaps involving a contested
medical service, consumer product, or investment—but they are forced to do so
under conditions of ignorance that result when market forces and constitutional law
provide overlapping speaker prerogatives. In such circumstances, over time, citizens
become conditioned to modes of decision-making that favor easy, emotional
heuristics, groupthink, and deference to authority.
This Article seeks to broaden the discussion around compelled speech law to
include a critical perspective on post-truthism. It is not meant to suggest that posttruthism has somehow “taken over” the First Amendment. In fact, the case law
applying the Zauderer doctrine reveals lower federal courts often resisting post-truth
arguments and value judgments because they so plainly contradict free speech and
rational-actor principles.13 The Article seeks to persuade the reader that a more
nuanced understanding of post-truthism and a little political context shed important
light on what is happening in this dynamic area of First Amendment law.
Although my post-truth frame is new, this Article is part of a small but growing
literature that describes how law has evolved in ways that undermine evidence-based
decision-making. Jane Bambauer, for example, has argued that laws like the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) make it more difficult for journalists and
academics to gather and analyze private-actor data.14 Her proposed solution is a
“modest commitment to Empirical Liberty” under the First Amendment, which could
serve as a basis for an affirmative right to access information.15 Sonia Katyal has

13. In one recent example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reheard en banc an appeal
concerning warning labels for sugar-sweetened beverages. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty.
of S.F. (ABA 2019), 916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2019). In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit clarified
that a court can reach the “purely factual and uncontroversial” standard last in its analysis
under Zauderer, an approach that eases the doctrinal pressure on controversiality
determinations in that circuit. Id. at 757, 759–60 (declining to decide “whether the warning
here is factually accurate and noncontroversial”); see infra Section III.B.
14. “For example,” Bambauer writes,
the CFAA has been interpreted by several federal courts to apply serious civil
and criminal penalties to anybody who accesses a website for a purpose that
violates the website’s terms of service, even when the website is available to the
public . . . . The criminal provisions are not limited to instances of unauthorized
access that cause risk of harm. And both the criminal and civil provisions of the
CFAA expose violators to much more liability than an ordinary contract claim
would.
Jane R. Bambauer, The Empirical First Amendment, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 957–58 (2017).
Because many websites have terms of service that prohibit “scraping information and the use
of fake identities to make online accounts,” she explains, the CFAA presents a risk of serious
legal consequences to researchers “who would like to test online services for evidence of racial
bias or who would like to scrape publicly displayed information in order to put it in a more
usable form for sociological research.” Id. at 958.
15. Id. at 959. Bambauer argues that empirical liberty should function to limit laws that
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critically examined how courts “deny defendants access to the source code for
software that produces the evidence used to convict them,” and has proposed
solutions that increase opportunities for whistleblowing and information-forcing.16
This growing literature focuses attention on the decision-making effects of law,
particularly where information asymmetries serve the powerful at the expense of the
powerless.
Part I unpacks post-truthism as a basis for regulating information. Because posttruthism assigns value to some kinds of information but not to others, it argues,
information regulation can easily promote post-truth ideals. A defining feature of
post-truthism is its rejection of fact-based reasoning as a means to advance the
interests of powerful actors. This leaves the powerful actors in a position to exploit
their existing informational advantages for political or economic gain.
Part II argues that a growing proportion of compelled speech cases are political,
and that this explains why post-truth ideas have begun cropping up in compelled
speech case law. It explores the political stakes in compelled speech disputes, which
are framed by a growing conflict between Information Haves and Information HaveNots.
Part III is a deep dive into legal doctrine. It describes a main mechanism through
which compelled speech doctrine is evolving to produce post-truth information
regulation: tests that lower the bar for disclosure of “uncontroversial” facts and raise
it for disclosure of “controversial” facts. In essence, some courts have interpreted
Zauderer to mean that mandates of “purely factual and uncontroversial” commercial
disclosures can receive less searching First Amendment scrutiny than disclosures that
do not satisfy this standard.17 Lower courts, citing Zauderer, have fashioned de facto
controversiality tests that calibrate First Amendment scrutiny based on whether the
underlying information relates to a public controversy. 18
Part IV criticizes this approach to Zauderer and argues that post-truth doctrines
subvert core First Amendment values. For example, it shows how sliding scale
protection for “controversial” and “uncontroversial” disclosures is at odds with the
“marketplace of ideas” metaphor, and with time-honored American ideals about
decision-making at the individual level. It also explains that while there are valid
reasons to worry about government-mandated disclosure of “controversial”
information, the Zauderer framework discounts those reasons.
Part V shows that Zauderer’s focus on regulating the flow of “controversial”
information has migrated outside the commercial speech category. Other courts,

constrain the ability of “outsiders” to access the information of “insiders,” often commercial
actors. Id. at 957. As examples, she cites “trade secrets laws, privacy laws, . . . and anti-hacking
laws.” Id. Her “insider” and “outsider” labels roughly correspond to the Information “Haves”
and “Have-Nots” that I introduce in Part III; Bambauer’s “insiders” are “inside” large
organizational actors that gather and produce information, and her “outsiders” are information
end users like researchers and academics.
16. Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66
UCLA L. REV. 54, 60, 140–41 (2019) (proposing changes to trade secrets law and
whistleblower protections as possible transparency-enhancing strategies).
17. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
18. See infra Section III.A.
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reviewing other sorts of disclosure mandates, such as crisis pregnancy clinic
disclosures, have considered controversiality qua controversiality important to their
First Amendment analysis. Although these cases are outliers, they reveal the
potential for post-truth ideas to spread beyond commercial speech and to influence
information-forcing law broadly.
Before the Article concludes, Part VI provides a snapshot of where the post-truth
path may take us next. At the “less restrictive means” step of First Amendment
analysis, some courts have interpreted narrow tailoring to require the government—
rather than an organizational speaker, like a private company—to communicate
controversial disclosures to the public. That is, these courts take the view that a
disclosure law may fail “less restrictive means” analysis unless the law makes the
State the channel of controversial information to the citizenry. This final doctrinal
move is startling and wrongheaded; government filtering of information is itself a
problem cognizable by the First Amendment. The government-filtering preference
underscores why a post-truth lens sheds important light on even small doctrinal
maneuvers that, increasingly, determine whether and how citizens will have access
to information.
I. WHAT IS POST-TRUTHISM?
Because post-truthism is mainly understood as a political problem, it is not
obvious how post-truth ideas are relevant to First Amendment law. Essentially, posttruthism teaches that people should not use evidence-based reasoning to make
decisions, but should rely instead on emotion, intuition, and belief.19 This preference
for feelings over facts provides a basis for regulating information, one that weighs
speech burdens and interests according to post-truth values.
A. Defining the Problem of Post-Truthism
Between 2016 and 2018, “post-truth” became a critical entry in our political
lexicon.20 Oxford Dictionaries named it the word of the year for 2016, underscoring
its new popularity and, in an accompanying essay, going far to define its meaning.21
According to Oxford Dictionaries, post-truth describes “circumstances in which
objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion

19. William Davies, The Age of Post-Truth Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/opinion/campaign-stops/the-age-of-post-truth
-politics.html [https://perma.cc/L5GS-GZN6] (the “promise of facts” is to establish a “shared
stable reality,” while the “promise of data” is to “sense shifts in public sentiment”).
20. The label “post-factual” may be more accurate than “post-truth.” Often, the two terms
are used interchangeably. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, TRUE ENOUGH: LEARNING TO LIVE IN A
POST-FACT SOCIETY (2006); Elizabeth S. Goodstein, Money, Relativism, and the Post-Truth
Political Imaginary, 50 PHIL & RHETORIC 483, 485 (2017). For rhetorical purposes, I have
retained the more common term, “post-truth.”
21. Word of the Year 2016 Is…, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries
.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016 [https://perma.cc/6U8J-XUUK].
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and personal belief.”22 This definition, which treats post-truthism as exclusively
descriptive and as chiefly concerned with public opinion (i.e., politics) is incomplete.
In popular culture, commentators use “post-truth” to describe situations in which
lies are intentionally spread for political gain, suggesting that post-truthism is a
political strategy.23 Often, the “post-truth” label is applied to politicians: U.S.
President Donald Trump comes to mind, but the term was used in 2004 to describe
then-President George W. Bush’s efforts to build support for the Iraq War.24
“Truthfulness has never been counted among the political virtues,” Hannah Arendt
wrote in 1967.25
Corporations can also employ post-truth politics. Oil companies engage in posttruth tactics when they underwrite dubious research and spread false claims that deny
climate change; the label fits because the companies are politically motivated to
forestall regulation.26 Pundits and bloggers who promote conspiracy theories about
school shootings, such as the 2012 Sandy Hook massacre and the more recent
Parkland, Florida shooting, also are often described as fomenting post-truth
politics.27 While these pundits may not personally profit from spreading false claims

22. Id.
23. In a recent example, commentators used the term “post-truth” to describe
communications by members of the Trump administration about a November 7, 2018, White
House press conference. See, e.g., Catie Keck, Kellyanne Conway Says Doctored Video of Jim
Acosta Was ‘Not Altered,’ Just ‘Sped Up,’ GIZMODO (Nov. 11, 2018, 1:15 PM),
https://gizmodo.com/kellyanne-conway-says-doctored-video-of-jim-acosta-was-1830368974
[https://perma.cc/KT7X-F966]. For more details, see Manuela Tobias, Fact-Checking
Distorted Video Sarah Sanders Used to Bar a CNN White House Reporter, POLITIFACT (Nov.
8, 2018, 6:10 PM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2018/nov/08/fact
-checking-misleading-video-sarah-sanders-used-/ [https://perma.cc/W5QW-AF7H].
24. ERIC ALTERMAN, WHEN PRESIDENTS LIE: A HISTORY OF OFFICIAL DECEPTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 294 (2004).
25. Hannah Arendt, Truth and Politics, NEW YORKER, Feb. 25, 1967, at 70. Arendt, the
premiere philosopher of totalitarianism, observed that lies “are often used as substitutes for
more violent means,” and thus “are apt to be considered relatively harmless tools in the arsenal
of political action.” Id. at 49. More recently, John Corner explained that “‘[p]ost-truth’ is a
self-consciously grand term of epochal shift (trading heavily on assumptions about an ‘era of
truth’ we apparently once enjoyed).” John Corner, Fake News, Post-Truth and Media-Political
Change, 39 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 1100, 1100 (2017).
26. See, e.g., NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A
HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL
WARMING 169–215 (2010); Dana Nuccitelli, Fake News Is a Threat to Humanity, but Scientists
May Have a Solution, GUARDIAN (Dec. 27, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.theguardian
.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2017/dec/27/fake-news-is-a-threat-to
-humanity-but-scientists-may-have-a-solution [https://perma.cc/LLX5-AX2P] (there is “no
better example” of the “‘post-truth’ era” than climate change).
27. See, e.g., Dennis Behreandt, Propaganda: Fight for the Minds of Children, NEW AM.
(May 25, 2018), https://www.thenewamerican.com/print-magazine/item/29132-propagandafight-for-the-minds-of-children [https://perma.cc/U2FF-947Z] (the “best example” of the
“‘post-truth’ era” emerged in the wake of the Parkland shooting, when “kids themselves
became not just the symbolic content of the propaganda, but simultaneously were offered up
as their very own propagandists, in a sort of ‘propaganda selfie’”).
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(although some certainly do profit), they are politically motivated—they seek to
undermine gun control efforts with which they disagree.
Importantly, however, many writers claim that “post-truth” signifies something
more than garden-variety political lies. “Politicians have lied for centuries,” one
commentator observed before the 2016 election. 28 “What’s new is the rapid-fire,
constant nature of the lies, paired with the fact that they’re so easily debunked.
Traditionally, politicians have at least tried to hide their dishonesty, due to the
assumption that voters would care.”29 What is different, these commentators claim,
is that truth matters less than it used to. Somehow, the truth has become “of
secondary importance.”30
In 2016, in an oft-cited CNN interview, Newt Gingrich, a politician, and Alisyn
Camerota, a journalist, went back and forth about Gingrich’s false claim that violent
crime was rising in America.31 Camerota observed that Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) crime statistics showed violent crime was at a historic low. In
response, Gingrich asserted: “what I said is equally true. People feel it.” 32 Camerota
replied, “They feel it, yes, but the facts don’t support it.”33 “As a political candidate,”

28. Heather Wilhelm, Commentary: Donald Trump and the Post-Truth Election, CHI.
TRIB. (Mar. 18, 2016, 8:28 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion
/commentary/ct-donald-trump-lies-riots-wall-mexico-perspec-0318-jm-20160318-story.html
[https://perma.cc/R9QD-LX6P].
29. Id.; see also Goldstein, supra note 5 (noting that the “prevalence” of post-truth acts
“does seem like a genuinely new phenomenon”).
30. Post-Truth Politics: Art of the Lie, ECONOMIST (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www
.economist.com/leaders/2016/09/10/art-of-the-lie [https://perma.cc/D3D6-EZH2]; see also
D.W. Pine, Is Truth Dead? Behind the TIME Cover, TIME (Mar. 23, 2017),
http://time.com/4709920/donald-trump-truth-time-cover/
[https://perma.cc/78KA-NCHF]
(discussing magazine cover that asks “Is Truth Dead?”); Goldstein, supra note 5 (describing
post-truthism as “the downgrading of truth”). Oxford Dictionaries agrees: “Rather than simply
referring to the time after a specified situation or event—as in post-war or post-match—the
prefix in post-truth has a meaning more like ‘belonging to a time in which the specified
concept has become unimportant or irrelevant.’” Word of the Year, supra note 21. The
Wikipedia entry for “post-truth politics” likewise asserts that “[p]ost-truth differs from
traditional contesting and falsifying of facts by relegating facts . . . to be of secondary
importance relative to appeal to emotion.” Post-truth Politics, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-truth_politics [https://perma.cc/5Q6B-K42Z]; cf. Tamara
R. Piety, Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas: Commercial Speech and the Problem
that Won’t Go Away, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 181, 188 (2007) (questioning “whether the public
has much of an appetite for truth”).
31. Was Donald Trump’s Speech Too Dark?; Newt Gingrich Clarifies Comments on
Sharia Law; Clinton to Announce Running Mate Soon; Democratic National Convention
Begins on Monday; Late-Night Comics Take Jabs at RNC. Aired 8:30-9a ET, CNN (July 22,
2016,
8:30
AM),
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1607/22/nday.06.html
[https://perma.cc/J3M5-5YDT].
32. Id.
33. Id.
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Gingrich said, “I’ll go with how people feel and I’ll let you go with the theoriticians
[sic].”34
The exchange revealed something critical: most people view truth as essential,
today as in the past.35 However, some people “find” truth through the use of posttruth reasoning: they discount empirical data and rely instead upon emotional inputs,
personal belief, deference to authority, and trust—even to determine truths that are
empirically testable, like whether violent crime is going up or down. When these
individuals are told by a trusted political leader that violent crime is rising, and this
idea connects with the individuals’ gut feelings and fears, they may conclude that
violent crime is rising across the United States, even though it is not.
In one theory, post-truthism is the natural consequence of cognitive biases that we
are only now beginning to understand.36 According to this behavioral approach,
changes in technology and the information economy have made it particularly easy
for cognitive biases to influence belief formation and decision-making.37 Cognitive
theories of post-truthism are descriptive and treat individuals as victims of posttruthism rather than agents of it. A common argument is that post-truthism reflects
confirmation bias, in which “truth is . . . accepted based on whether the opinion
presented aligns with what the [audience] already believes.”38 Another, demonstrated
by the work of psychologist Colleen Seifert and others, posits that post-truthism

34. Id. Ironically, Gingrich was not a candidate for public office when he made this
statement.
35. For additional insight on the exchange between Camerota and Gingrich, see LEE
MCINTYRE, POST-TRUTH 2–4 (2018).
36. For example, in 2016, the Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman attributed the Brexit
movement to “emotional” arguments based on “irritation and anger.” Ambrose EvansPritchard, AEP: ‘Irritation and Anger’ May Lead to Brexit, Says Influential Psychologist,
TELEGRAPH (June 6, 2016, 8:31 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/06/05
/british-voters-succumbing-to-impulse-irritation-and-anger---and/
[https://perma.cc/6Y2B
-FYNU].
37. There is significant and growing literature on the connection between psychological
biases and political outlook. Law professor Dan Kahan has written extensively on this
connection; his work shows that individuals selectively interpret data to conform
interpretations to their political outlook. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Erica Cantrell
Dawson & Paul Slovic, Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-Government, 1 BEHAV.
PUB. POL’Y 54 (2017). Kahan maintains a blog on the subject at http://www
.culturalcognition.net/blog/. See also Julie Beck, This Article Won’t Change Your Mind,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/this-article
-wont-change-your-mind/519093/ [https://perma.cc/FLF7-S8MS]; Dan Jones, Seeing Reason:
How to Change Minds in a ‘Post-Fact’ World, NEW SCIENTIST (Nov. 30, 2016), https://
www.newscientist.com/article/mg23631520-800-grand-delusions-why-we-all-believe-the
-weirdest-things/ [https://perma.cc/8587-MYFC] (summarizing research).
38. Weston Williams, Post-Truth: What Oxford’s Word of the Year Says About Modern
Discourse, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/The
-Culture/2016/1116/Post-truth-what-Oxford-s-word-of-the-year-says-about-moderndiscourse [https://perma.cc/C7GH-SAZF].
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exploits repetition bias, in which people come to believe information simply because
they have heard it repeated several times.39
Importantly, by treating post-truthism as an accident of faulty cognition, the
behavioral approach fails to consider it as a value system. If the behavioralists are
right, post-truthism probably cannot be addressed through law; we cannot, for
example, criminalize false political speech. Instead, the cognitive approach suggests,
the individual decision maker must self-police; and, indeed, a group of psychologists
has proposed cognitive “interventions” in the form of a pledge that one must adopt
on an individual basis.40 Because the behavioral approach views individuals as
organically vulnerable to certain types of manipulation, it presents post-truthism as
more or less inevitable—an inescapable consequence of technological innovations,
such as the internet and social media, that are making possible new methods of
manipulation.41
In a different theory, post-truthism describes a “tribal epistemology” in which
one’s use of information to make decisions is heavily shaped by subjective factors
that connect one to a “tribe.”42 Journalist David Roberts describes this as a system in
which “[i]nformation is evaluated based not on conformity to common standards of
evidence or correspondence to a common understanding of the world, but on whether
it supports the tribe’s values and goals and is vouchsafed by tribal leaders.”43 This
sort of tribalism actually encourages members to embrace false claims, because “a
pledge of political allegiance achieves greater authenticity if it flies in the face of

39. See, e.g., Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich K.H. Ecker, Colleen M. Seifert, Norbert
Schwarz & John Cook, Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence and
Successful Debiasing, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 106, 113 (2012).
40. Gleb Tsipursky, Fabio Votta & Kathryn M. Roose, Fighting Fake News and PostTruth Politics with Behavioral Science: The Pro-Truth Pledge, 27 BEHAV. & SOC. ISSUES 47,
50 (2018) [hereinafter Tsipursky, Fighting Fake News] (proposing a solution in which people
pledge to engage in twelve behaviors “that research in psychology shows correlates with an
orientation toward truthfulness”); see also Gleb Tsipursky, Towards a Post-Lies Future:
Fighting “Alternative Facts” and “Post-Truth” Politics, HUMANIST, Mar.–Apr. 2017, at 14
[hereinafter Tsipursky, Post-Lies Future] (“[P]eople can train themselves to evaluate reality
accurately and thus make wise decisions.”).
41. Some commentators have suggested that poor information literacy compounds posttruthism. According to Daniel J. Levitin, “[i]n the old days, factual books and news articles
simply looked authentic, compared to a screed that some nut might have printed in their
basement on a home printing press. The Internet has changed that, of course. A crank website
can look as authentic as an authoritative, fact-checked one.” DANIEL J. LEVITIN, WEAPONIZED
LIES: HOW TO THINK CRITICALLY IN THE POST-TRUTH ERA, at xix (2016).
42. David Roberts, Donald Trump and the Rise of Tribal Epistemology, VOX (May 19,
2017, 9:58 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/3/22/14762030/Donald
-trump-tribal-epistemology [https://perma.cc/2V2Y-D3M9]; see also EVAN DAVIS, POSTTRUTH: WHY WE HAVE REACHED PEAK BULLSHIT AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT, at xx
(2017) (“A certain number of people seem to hold views not because they think the evidence
supports them, but because they feel that professing a belief in them can serve as an expression
of group allegiance and loyalty.”); Goldstein, supra note 5 (ascribing post-truthism to political
“tribalism”).
43. Roberts, supra note 42.
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counter-evidence.”44 The greater the lie, the greater the loyalty you demonstrate by
adopting the lie. In the “tribal” view, political polarization is both a cause and an
effect of post-truthism, and the result is a sort of downward spiral away from
empirically testable truth. In the tribalism approach, as in the behavioral approach, it
is difficult to see much of a role for law in either promoting or challenging posttruthism.
What the tribal theory gets right is its depiction of post-truthism as a system that
ascribes different grades of value to different kinds of information. Such a system
gives little weight to the tribal member’s subjective experience of information, and
emphasizes the community’s process of assigning information value. High value is
assigned to modes of reasoning that reinforce tribal ties—not just emotion and belief
but also deference to authority and groupthink—and tribal elites are incentivized to
make decisions that elevate loyalty above objectivity.
The tribal theory also underscores post-truthism’s threat to democracy. One of the
main concerns raised by commentators about post-truth politics is that it creates an
opening for fascism or autocracy. For one thing, “[d]emocracy is under threat when
the truth is no longer a check on power.”45 That is, if citizens do not understand the
truth of what is happening in their communities, they cannot exercise sovereignty
over their own lives. Post-truthism may also create an opening for fascism because
it undermines trust in political institutions.46 The loss of trust could set into motion
steps—such as widespread disengagement—that lead to democratic failure. In
addition, some commentators suggest that, by destroying common factual ground
between groups, tribal post-truth politics discourage compromise, which is an
essential part of democratic self-government.47 Others have pointed out how posttruthism conflicts with ideas of freedom and consent, which are integral to
democratic decision-making.48
Hannah Arendt argued that an “extreme contempt for facts” was essential to the
rise of totalitarianism.49 Her explorations of truth, falsity, and political power remain

44. Goldstein, supra note 5.
45. Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake News, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 845, 869
(2018).
46. See Tsipursky, Post-Lies Future, supra note 40, at 14 (“[T]ruth in politics is a
common good just like clean air and water, and the pollution of truth will devastate our
political system . . . .”).
47. See, e.g., Bradley Onishi, Dehumanizing Huckabee Tweet Another Echo of
Dangerous Tribalism, REWIRE.NEWS (June 23, 2018, 9:18 PM), https://rewire.news/religion
-dispatches/2018/06/23/dehumanizing-huckabee-tweet-another-echo-dangerous-tribalism/
[https://perma.cc/NJP3-CJ4H] (“It’s either ‘us’ or ‘them’; there can be no middle ground, no
third category, no space for discussion, debate, or dialogue.”); David Roberts, America Is
Facing an Epistemic Crisis, VOX (Nov. 2, 2017, 8:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and
-politics/2017/11/2/16588964/america-epistemic-crisis [https://perma.cc/6V52-KK4Q] (“We
no longer learn or know things together, as a country, so we can no longer act together, as a
country.”).
48. Will Fish, “Post-Truth” Politics and Illusory Democracy, 14 PSYCHOTHERAPY & POL.
INT’L 211, 212 (2016).
49. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 461 (2004).
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among the most influential in political philosophy. Arendt perceived critical
differences in the ways in which political lies functioned for the masses versus the
movement elite. For the masses, the totalitarian movement would “conjure up a lying
world of consistency which is more adequate to the needs of the human mind than
reality itself.”50 In contrast, Arendt observed, the movement elite was characterized
by “cynicism” imbued with tribal loyalty; they did not believe the totalitarian lies,
but truth was beside the point.51 Arendt, like current commentators, identified both
behavioralism (irrationality) and tribalism (cynical and self-conscious lying) at
work.52
Arendt’s insights keenly apply to our current moment. “[T]he gullibility of
sympathizers makes lies credible to the outside world,” she explained, “while at the
same time the graduated cynicism of membership and elite formations [of the
movement] eliminates the danger that the Leader will ever be forced by the weight
of his own propaganda to make good his own statements.”53 The “outside world,”
Arendt wrote, misunderstands this system, and wrongly believes that either the “very
enormity of totalitarian lies would be their undoing,” or that “it would be possible to
take the Leader at his word and force him, regardless of his original intentions, to
make it good.”54 In fact, she explains, the Leader will never have to make good on
the lies.55
Adam Kirsch, writing in 2017, likewise suggested that “a large share of the
population . . . thrill[s] precisely to the falsehood of a statement, because it shows
that the speaker has the power to reshape reality in line with their own fantasies of
self-righteous beleaguerment.”56 In this sense, lying is more than a pledge of tribal
allegiance, even a cynical one—it is about power. The philosopher Lee McIntyre,
author of a book-length treatment of post-truthism, also perceives post-truthism to
be about raw power. He writes that post-truthism “amounts to a form of ideological
supremacy, whereby its practitioners are trying to compel someone to believe in
something, whether there is good evidence for it or not.”57 It is, he writes, a “recipe
for political domination.”58

50. Id. at 464.
51. Id. at 500–01.
52. Id. at 464–65, 500–01.
53. Id. at 501.
54. Id. at 501–02.
55. Id.
56. Adam Kirsch, Lie to Me: Fiction in the Post-Truth Era, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/books/lie-to-me-fiction-in-the-post-truth-era.html
[https://perma.cc/4JMZ-MSAS]; see also Goodstein, supra note 20, at 491 (“[T]he rise of the
political power of revealed religion in late antiquity, which so powerfully demonstrated the
capacity of emotionally grounded belief to connect, mobilize, and motivate human beings,
went . . . hand in hand with the decline of democratic practices and the rise of authoritarian
powers.”).
57. MCINTYRE, supra note 35, at 13.
58. Id. Ominously, Arendt demonstrated that political lies create tensions that can reshape
a movement’s objectives. Eventually, she wrote, totalitarianism becomes bound up with its
lies so completely that it must, to survive, eliminate “every competing nontotalitarian reality.”
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Some have suggested that post-truthism is part of a “historic shift away from the
principles and values of the project of Enlightenment,” “upending long-held
practices of treating human beings as rational agents.”59 In the rational-actor model,
each decision maker weighs whatever information she wants according to her own
individual preferences to maximize her own personal utility. Post-truthism does not
leave questions of weight and value to the individual; it favors groupthink,
submission, and obedience. In a post-truth world, citizens do not actively participate
in the formation of public opinion so much as they affirm or reject ideas presented
to them, on the basis of emotional appeal.60
Post-truth values can also be observed outside the political domain, in the
marketplace. Should one buy a widget after an exhaustive cost-benefit analysis, or
based on brand loyalty? Post-truthism, and powerful brand-name companies, counsel
in favor of the latter. As a decision-making heuristic that leans heavily on emotion
and trust, brand loyalty is a form of post-truth reasoning. Loyalty to the Trump
brand—which was a consumer brand before it became a political one—is often
associated with current post-truth politics.
B. Post-Truthism as a Theory of Information Use
Whatever post-truthism is descriptively, it presents as a set of decision-making
values. Insofar as post-truthism matters in law, it is because post-truthism offers a
normative account of information use.61 In this account, some types of information—
such as emotion, intuition, and belief—have greater value than other types of
information, like facts, evidence, and data. What is more, certain sources of
information have superior value, and certain channels of information are more
trustworthy.62 Thus, when Donald J. Trump opines that CNN is “fake news,” he is
expressing post-truthism as a normative value: he is telling his audience not to trust
information obtained from CNN, and not to factor news from CNN into their

ARENDT, supra note 49, at 510 (“The struggle for total domination of the total population of
the earth, the elimination of every competing nontotalitarian reality, is inherent in the
totalitarian regimes themselves; if they do not pursue global rule as their ultimate goal, they
are only too likely to lose whatever power they have already seized.”). Thus, a movement that
relies on post-truth reasoning may eventually become driven by the need to silence other
truths, and to do so through expansion.
59. Goodstein, supra note 20, at 490.
60. Cf. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 483
(2011) (noting that “participating in the formation of public opinion” is “a form of
communicative action”).
61. “[T]he underlying concern about a post-truth society,” writes Evan Davis, “is why
there is so much bullshit.” DAVIS, supra note 42, at xv. Davis’s view—that we mainly should
be concerned about post-truthism’s causes—is widely expressed in popular commentary but,
in my view, misses the point. The underlying concern about post-truthism, I argue, is that posttruthism can easily provide a basis for regulating information. Our attention to post-truthism
should be forward looking, not merely retrospective.
62. As Rebecca Tushnet has pointed out, “[s]cientific evidence indicates that emotion and
rationality are not opposed . . . but rather inextricably linked.” Rebecca Tushnet, More Than
a Feeling: Emotion and the First Amendment, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2392, 2392 (2014).

2019]

THE POS T - TR UT H FIRS T A ME N DM EN T

1365

decision-making.63 Instead, he suggests, citizens should make decisions and form
beliefs in reliance on information provided by him and his approved sources.
This Article argues that because post-truthism is fully realized only through
information’s use, what post-truthism offers is a regulatory system in which the flow
of information to decision makers is regulated with particular attention to the
information’s value and influence. In First Amendment law, this translates into
careful parsing of listener interests. 64 When a doctrine turns, in whole or in part, on
the value of information for its end user, that doctrine requires legal institutions, such
as courts, to analyze and pass judgment on the value of the information.
Determinations that information is “factual,” or “material,” or, in the domain of
compelled speech, “controversial,” are value judgments about whether and how end
users should treat the information as decision-making inputs.
Rhetorically, the link between information value and use are commonly presented
in two separate but related post-truth arguments.
1. The Fact-Opinion Ploy
The first is the notion that facts are illusory; we should not trust facts. According
to this idea, information labeled as “fact” is usually just biased information presented
to advance the speaker’s ideological agenda.
Post-truth reasoners often express this point by arguing that fact cannot be
distinguished from opinion. Because opinions can be presented as facts, they
contend, all facts are suspect, and we should not trust facts as a basis for decisionmaking. This Article refers to this argument as the Fact-Opinion Ploy.65 It is a “ploy”
or gambit in the sense that it typically is used to undercut an opponent who has
offered facts to support a contention.

63. In my view, the “fake news” label (as distinguished from factually incorrect news) is
used to advance the normative post-truth agenda by discrediting certain types and sources of
information. As I explain, post-truthism is served when the quantity of information and the
channels of information available to end users are reduced.
64. See, e.g., Reza R. Dibadj, The Political Economy of Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L.
REV. 913, 915 (2007) (noting that the push for expanded commercial speech protections
“bizarrely shifts attention away from speakers toward listeners and information”). Cases like
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, in which the Second Circuit held that “strong consumer
interest’’ was “inadequate” to justify a product labeling disclosure, underscore the willingness
of courts to discriminate among listener uses for information, thereby imposing a judge-made
hierarchy of information values. 92 F.3d 67, 73–74 (2d Cir. 1996).
65. In her essay “Truth and Politics,” Hannah Arendt described “[t]he blurring of the
dividing line between factual truth and opinion” as a form of intentional lying that is common
to politics. Arendt, supra note 25, at 68. However, Arendt was describing something different
from the “ploy” I describe in the text. She described the situation in which a liar, “lacking the
power to make his falsehood stick, does not insist on the gospel truth of his statement but
pretends that this is his ‘opinion,’ to which he claims his constitutional right.” Id. Arendt’s
insight suggests that the blurring of the dividing line between fact and opinion can be used to
bolster one’s own lies as much as to undercut the facts of one’s opponent. That is, to
characterize a true or false fact as opinion affects its value as a decisional input.
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The Supreme Court has come across versions of the Fact-Opinion Ploy in various
speech-related contexts, including the law of defamation66 and securities fraud.67 The
Court has consistently resisted holding either that constitutional doctrine should turn
on the distinction between fact and opinion, or that fact and opinion are the same
thing. Importantly for purposes of this Article, it has also resisted holding that a
distinction between fact and opinion etches a line between permissible and
impermissible forms of compelled speech.68
2. The “Alternative Facts” Thesis
A second strain of post-truth thought, which this Article calls the Alternative Facts
Thesis, is the idea that contested information is inherently untrustworthy. It posits
that, in a controversy, each side will present information in its favor (“alternative
facts”).69 The more contested an idea is, the more information will be found on both

66. Thus, for example, the law of defamation recognizes a limited fact/opinion distinction,
while cautioning against enforcing an “artificial dichotomy.” Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990); see also Levinsky’s, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 127
(1st Cir. 1997) (“A statement couched as an opinion that presents or implies the existence of
facts which are capable of being proven true or false can be actionable” as defamation.); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (“However pernicious an opinion may
seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas.”).
67. In its interpretation of federal securities law, the Supreme Court has held that opinions
can present or imply the existence of facts and can give rise to liability for securities fraud on
that basis. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1083, 1093 (1991) (holding that
a statement of opinion can constitute a “misstatement[] of material fact” in violation of federal
securities law because board opinions expressed in Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) filings are “reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis . . . the absence of which
renders them misleading”).
68. In 1988, in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, charities
subject to the North Carolina Charitable Solicitations Act asked the Court to do just that. 487
U.S. 781 (1988). The Court went on to invalidate the disclosure because it required
information to be disclosed during a particular, message-based expression by the speaker—
thereby changing the content of a voluntary expression. Id. at 795; see also Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573–74 (1995) (noting that
the “general rule[] that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies not only to
expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker
would rather avoid, subject, perhaps, to the permissive law of defamation” (citations omitted)).
69. The term “alternative facts” comes from a now-famous television news interview
given by Kellyanne Conway on NBC’s Meet the Press on January 22, 2017. See Rebecca
Sinderbrand, How Kellyanne Conway Ushered in the Era of ‘Alternative Facts,’ WASH. POST
(Jan.
22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/22/how
-kellyanne-conway-ushered-in-the-era-of-alternative-facts/?utm_term=.b4486c1a073f
[https://perma.cc/5TKV-YSAE]. In a heated discussion between Conway and host Chuck
Todd, Todd pressed Conway about White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer’s assertion that
the crowd at Donald Trump’s inauguration was “the largest audience to ever witness an
inauguration – period . . . .” Rachel Chason, Sean Spicer Says He ‘Absolutely’ Regrets CrowdSize Briefing, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the
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sides of the issue. On this view, facts are not that helpful for resolving a dispute,
because the greater the controversy, the greater the cacophony of facts bombarding
us from both sides.70 This line of argument, which is related to “whataboutism,” 71
teaches that more facts make a dispute murkier, not clearer, and that contestation
itself signals a lack of trustworthiness.
The Alternative Facts Thesis shares much in common with the rise of “balanced
reporting” in American journalism. Lee McIntyre, writing about the coverage of
climate change on television news programs in the 1990s, described how
“[o]vernight, the public was treated to split-screen TV ‘debates’ with scientists on
one side and ‘skeptics’ on the other. The host would let them both talk for roughly
the same amount of time, then pronounce the issue ‘controversial.’” 72 Here, both the
false equivalency and the “controversial” label are important. False equivalency gave
the impression that the contentions of one side were equally matched by the
contentions of the other—thus demonstrating that reliance on facts and debate only
results in a draw. The spectacle of the controversy—in which two sides duked it out,
and it was neither possible nor really important to determine who was objectively
correct—became entertainment, and a way to attract eyeballs.73 The “controversial”

-fix/wp/2017/09/18/sean-spicer-says-he-absolutely-regrets-crowd-size-briefing/?noredirect
=on&utm_term=.416a9411679d [https://perma.cc/T8EM-XHE2]. Todd asked Conway why
President Trump had asked Spicer to “utter a falsehood” to the press, and added that this
“undermine[d] the credibility of the entire White House press office . . . on day one.”
Sinderbrand, supra. Conway danced around the question at first, but eventually offered a
candid post-truth rejoinder:
KELLYANNE CONWAY: Sean Spicer, our press secretary, gave alternative
facts to that.
CHUCK TODD: . . . . [A]lternative facts are not facts. They’re falsehoods.
Id.
70. Susan B. Glasser, the founding editor of Politico Magazine, offered a different insight.
In an essay describing the epochal changes she witnessed in the news industry from the 1980s
to Trump’s 2016 election, Glasser pointed out that, by 2016, the number of news sources had
exploded. Voters believed Trump’s falsehoods, she wrote, “not just because they disagree with
the facts as reporters have presented them but because there’s so damn many reporters, and
from such a wide array of outlets, that it’s often impossible to evaluate their standards and
practices, biases and preconceptions.” Susan B. Glasser, Covering Politics in a “Post-Truth”
America, BROOKINGS (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/essay/covering-politics-in
-a-post-truth-america/ [https://perma.cc/A2WJ-ADU5]. The public’s inability to assess
information quality likely contributes to the Alternative Facts Thesis (i.e., once information is
contested, it cannot be trusted, because the public lacks the tools to evaluate conflicting
claims).
71. “Whataboutism” is a rhetorical technique in which a person responds to an argument
or set of points not by addressing or answering those points, but by expanding the scope of the
discussion, often starting with the words, “What about…” The technique is associated with
Soviet propagandists and has its own Wikipedia entry. Whataboutism, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whataboutism [https://perma.cc/7LX4-JLNV].
72. MCINTYRE, supra note 35, at 80–81.
73. In The Art of the Deal, Donald Trump suggested that causing controversy is a valuable
media strategy, one that he used in his businesses. “[I]f you are a little different, or a little
outrageous, or if you do things that are bold or controversial, the press is going to write about
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label functioned as a heuristic or signal: information that is contested and therefore
controversial should be trusted less.
In their important book, Merchants of Doubt, Naomi Oreskes and Erik M.
Conway identify a concerted “tobacco strategy” as early as December 1953, when
the heads of major tobacco companies combined efforts with the public relations
giant, Hill and Knowlton, to create and fund the Tobacco Industry Research
Committee.74 Oreskes and Conway describe how these actors transformed “emerging
scientific consensus” about the health risks of smoking into a “raging scientific
‘debate.’”75 They did this by funding scientific research to undermine the growing
body of science connecting tobacco use to cancer, and by aggressively promoting a
“balance campaign” to journalists.76 Oreskes and Conway write:
The appeal to journalistic balance (as well as perhaps the industry’s large
advertising budget) evidently resonated with writers and editors, perhaps
because of the influence of the Fairness Doctrine. Under this doctrine,
established in 1949 (in conjunction with the rise of television), broadcast
journalists were required to dedicate airtime to controversial issues of
public concern in a balanced manner . . . . While the doctrine did not
formally apply to print journalism, many writers and editors seem to have
applied it to the tobacco question, because throughout the 1950s and well
into the 1960s, newspapers and magazines presented the smoking issue
as a great debate rather than as a scientific problem in which evidence
was rapidly accumulating . . . .77
More recently, social media companies have experimented with techniques to
fight the spread of false information on their platforms. From December 2016 to
December 2017, Facebook experimented with the use of “Disputed Flags,” red icons
that flagged content which had been disputed by fact-checkers.78 When it ended the

you . . . . I don’t mind controversy . . . .” DONALD J. TRUMP WITH TONY SCHWARTZ, TRUMP:THE
ART OF THE DEAL 39 (1987).
74. ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 26, at 10–35; see also ARI RABIN-HAVT & MEDIA
MATTERS FOR AMERICA, LIES, INCORPORATED: THE WORLD OF POST-TRUTH POLITICS 23–33
(2016).
75. ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 26, at 18–19; see also Tim Harford, The Problem
with Facts, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/eef2e2f8-0383-11e7-ace0
-1ce02ef0def9 [https://perma.cc/CUU7-U9ED] (exploring at length the connection between
tobacco companies’ efforts to distort evidence about health risks of smoking and posttruthism); RABIN-HAVT, supra note 74 , at 23–33. A lesser-known example is offered by
Lewandowsky et al., supra note 39, at 107. The authors describe “decades-long deceptive
advertising for Listerine mouthwash,” in which Listerine “falsely claimed for more than 50
years that the product helped prevent or reduce the severity of colds and sore throats.” Id. A
television ad campaign, required by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, ran from 1978 to
1980 but did not successfully dispel the company’s misinformation. Id.
76. ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 26, at 16.
77. Id. at 19.
78. See Tessa Lyons, Replacing Disputed Flags with Related Articles, FACEBOOK (Dec.
20,
2017),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/12/news-feed-fyi-updates-in-our-fight
-against-misinformation/ [https://perma.cc/PD6T-NRGK].
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experiment, Facebook executives published an article in Medium to explain what
they had learned.79 The article revealed that Facebook had ended its use of Disputed
Flags in part because the flags “could sometimes backfire” and because other
techniques “led to fewer shares of the hoax article than the disputed flag treatment.” 80
In other words, marking false content as contested by third-party fact-checkers did
not do much to stop people from sharing it. Instead, the Disputed Flag may have
signaled contestation, influencing the value of false information to particular users
and causing them to want to share it.81
Both the Fact-Opinion Ploy and the Alternative Facts Thesis embody normative
values about what sorts of information citizens should trust and use. The FactOpinion Ploy encourages citizens to view facts as inherently biased, and the
Alternative Facts Thesis encourages citizens to distrust contested facts. Both suggest
that, in a public dispute, emotion, personal belief, and deference to authority are
superior to biased or unhelpful fact-based reasoning.
3. The Post-Truth Information Economy
Finally, we might speak of a post-truth information economy—a system of
information exchange that discourages evidence-based reasoning, while facilitating
decision-making based on simple heuristics such as emotional reasoning, brand
loyalty, and groupthink. A post-truth information economy possesses two main
characteristics: channel compression and information gaps. It not only makes
evidence-based decision-making a challenge but, over time, habituates citizens to
passivity and dependence on a few “trusted” authorities. In fact, in a paradigmatic
post-truth world, there is only one channel of information, the State, and it transmits
information selectively for the purpose of retaining power.
Laws and economic policies could easily be used to shape the information
economy to serve post-truth aims. Censorship is characteristic of a post-truth
information economy, because it tends to reduce the availability of information, and
thus the range of inputs that a decision maker can consider. In post-truthism, of
course, whole categories of information are not valued and therefore can be regulated
away. In First Amendment cases, we might find judicial opinions holding that the
State’s interest in creating conditions of informed citizenship is not “compelling” or
“substantial.”82

79. Jeff Smith, Grace Jackson & Seetha Raj, Designing Against Misinformation, MEDIUM
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://medium.com/facebook-design/designing-against-misinformation
-e5846b3aa1e2 [https://perma.cc/X47P-MD3V].
80. Id.
81. For more detail on Facebook’s use of Disputed Flags and its follow-on feature,
“Related Articles,” see Sarah C. Haan, Facebook’s Alternative Facts, 105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
18 (2019).
82. For example, in NIFLA v. Becerra, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court expressly
refused to affirm that “providing low-income women with information about state-sponsored
services” was a “substantial state interest” under intermediate scrutiny. 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375
(2018).
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In a post-truth information environment, citizens may be encouraged to distrust
certain channels of information. For example, they could be taught that information
from the internet cannot be trusted—perhaps by disinformation campaigns that
spread false claims indiscriminately on the internet to discredit it. Information from
disfavored sources could be strictly regulated or policed.83 Or, courts might treat
disclosure laws designed to prevent citizens from being intentionally misled as
lacking merit.84 The net result of the narrowing of the field of information sources is
that citizens would have access to less information, and to fewer perspectives on the
information they did obtain.
Concentration in ownership of channels of information, such as news
organizations or social media, could reduce information flows and access. Since civic
organizations, including labor unions, serve important informational functions for
their members, a reduction in their number and clout would contribute to information
gaps. Information might be exclusively possessed by private actors who lack
incentives to share it, with no legal mechanisms of information forcing. In contrast,
the use of nonrational heuristics like brand loyalty would be encouraged and
protected by legal doctrine.
In thinking about the relationship of post-truthism to law, then, it is worth asking
how law shapes the information economy, and whether evolving legal doctrines
advance post-truth outcomes.
II. THE POLITICS OF COMPELLED SPEECH
A main premise of this Article is that we cannot understand the constitutional
problem presented by compelled speech without acknowledging the political
problem it presents to courts. When government restricts speech, the interests of
speakers and listeners are roughly aligned. Speakers want to produce speech, and
listeners want to receive it. Courts can resolve such cases in a way that vindicates the
interests of both speakers and listeners, promoting a diverse range of First
Amendment interests. They can do so by enforcing our constitutional preference for
limited government, which, when the subject is government restriction of speech,
means a preference for the unregulated flow of information and ideas.
Compelled speech is different. When government mandates disclosure, it is
because listeners seek information that speakers do not want to produce. Listeners’
and speakers’ interests are opposed.
This presents a political problem because, increasingly, speakers and listeners are
sorting into groups that are easily defined by their roles and power in the political
economy.

83. This is why, for example, it is common for proponents of post-truthism to argue in
favor of broad laws protecting public officials from defamation, and to threaten lawsuits.
84. Here again see NIFLA v. Becerra, in which the Supreme Court seemingly endorsed
practices that involved trickery and manipulation. 138 S. Ct. 2361; Julie Rikelman,
Symposium: The First Amendment Cannot Justify Lying to Women, SCOTUSblog (Dec. 13,
2017, 3:07 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/12/symposium-first-amendment-cannot
-justify-lying-women/ [https://perma.cc/9VTC-8SHR] (describing the deceptive practices of
crisis pregnancy centers that California’s FACT Act, which the Supreme Court partly enjoined
in NIFLA v. Becerra, was designed to counter).
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A. Demand-Side vs. Supply-Side Market Participants
In the United States, listener and speaker interest groups increasingly are defined
by their roles in market exchange. On the listener side, we mostly find individual
information end users, such as consumers, retail investors, citizens, and workers. On
the speaker side, we mostly find large organizations, often commercial actors. In this
dynamic, legislatures may intend for an information-forcing law to level the
informational playing field between powerful organizations that possess information
and less powerful individuals who lack it. What medical services does this clinic
offer? How many times has this company been sued for labor law violations? What
percentage of graduates from this college get jobs? Information that would answer
all of these questions has been the subject of disclosure laws challenged in recent
compelled speech cases.
From the perspective of end users, disclosure of information serves critical
functions: it furthers individual self-actualization, facilitates efficient capital
allocation, aids consumer decision-making, helps people make medical decisions,
promotes democratic self-government, and mitigates systemic risk. However, these
purposes matter little to speakers. From the perspective of speakers, disclosure
presents risks that the information will attract negative attention or permit meritbased assessments that harm the organization’s interests. For example, in an industry
in which six competing companies manufacture a product or provide a service, only
one company stands to win from evidence-based empirics that show which
company’s product or service is the “best” (or the safest, or the most durable, etc.).
The other five companies would be better off competing on other grounds. In an
increasingly data-rich world, disclosure also means that the organization loses
control of a valuable resource, its data, which could be utilized by enterprising
competitors. Stark differences between the interests of speakers and listeners mean
that judicial resolution of a First Amendment challenge to a disclosure mandate often
will have political consequences: it will promote the entrenched interests of powerful
organizations at the expense of less powerful individuals, or vice versa. 85 These
political choices have long been concealed in the grooves of precedent and analytical
convention.
It is difficult to summarize the technological and economic changes that, over the
past half century, have opened an information chasm between the average American
and the organizational actors that populate the economy. The simple bar code offers
a powerful example. Originally introduced in supermarkets in the mid-1970s to speed
up the checkout process and save labor costs, the bar code was universally adopted
by the late 1990s and repurposed as a data tool used to gather and analyze both
aggregate- and individual-level data on shoppers.86 Even before the rise of the

85. Accord Cohen, supra note 10 (developments in free speech law “reflect an economic
reality in which information has increasingly become untethered from industrial production to
become a source of value in its own right, and in which powerful interests that profit from
information-related activities have systematically resisted regulatory oversight”).
86. See Emek Basker, Change at the Checkout: Tracing the Impact of a Process
Innovation, 63 J. Indus. Econ. 339 (2015); Gavin Weightman, The History of the Bar Code,
SMITHSONIAN (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/history-bar
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internet as a retail platform, merchants were likely to have better data about
individual shoppers’ habits than the shoppers themselves, who lacked access to the
data and the means to make use of it. By mining patterns in the data across
populations—an effort that individuals could not replicate even if each person had
access to his or her own data—retailers successfully generated new descriptive and
predictive information about individuals. That is, the merchants’ access to aggregate
bar code data made it possible for them to produce new forms of individualized
data.87
In turn, the rise of bar code technology as a means of inventory management
facilitated the globalization of the supply chain, which has widened the geographic
separation between individual Americans and the production of basic consumer
products. This, too, has made it challenging for Americans to stay informed about
the products and services we use every day, and the labor and regulatory issues at
play in their production, while such information remains available, at a granular
level, to the organizations that operate in this global stream of commerce.
In recent years, First Amendment scholars have become increasingly attentive to
power differences between speakers and listeners in various contexts.88 Helen Norton
has advocated a listener-centered approach in which the law privileges listeners’ First
Amendment interests over speakers’ interests in certain communicative relationships
where “speakers enjoy advantages of information or power.”89 This listener-centered
approach would justify rational basis scrutiny for certain disclosure laws and inform
the application of other levels of scrutiny. 90 Norton writes that “greater attention to
the power asymmetries between speakers and listeners can inform our understanding
of when and how” the First Amendment should permit government to prevent certain
speakers from coercing comparatively vulnerable listeners. 91 So far, courts have not
adopted the commonsense view that power asymmetries between speakers and
listeners are relevant to compelled speech law.

-code-180956704/ [https://perma.cc/3Q26-ULLN]; Ellen Jean Hirst, 40 Years Ago Today:
Wrigley Gum the First Product to Have Its Bar Code Scanned, CHI. TRIB. (June 26, 2014),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-bar-code40-years-old-wrigley-gum-20140626
-story.html [https://perma.cc/V3ZW-YYL6].
87. Famously, Target developed data analytics to determine when a female customer was
likely to be pregnant. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html
[https://perma.cc/X7TX-VM74] (describing how Target learned about a Minneapolis
teenager’s pregnancy before her own father did because of Target’s “pregnancy prediction”
data analytics program).
88. These contexts include professional speech and employer speech. On the former, see
Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238 (2016). On the latter, see Helen
Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101
MINN. L. REV. 31 (2016).
89. Helen Norton, Powerful Speakers and Their Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 441, 445
(2019); see also Norton, supra note 9; Norton, supra note 88.
90. Norton, supra note 89 (manuscript at 9).
91. Norton, supra note 88, at 77.
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B. Information Capitalism
Information capitalism, in which data is monetized through exchange (rather than
merely collected by private actors for their own use) contributes to asymmetries
between commercial actors and individuals. Shoshana Zuboff coined the term
“surveillance capitalism,” to describe a “technologically advanced” system of
economic transactions that capitalize on “asymmetries in knowledge.”92 In Zuboff’s
conception, surveillance capitalism expresses an economic logic that produces
“instrumentarian power,” which “produces endlessly accruing knowledge for
surveillance capitalists and endlessly diminishing freedom for us.”93 Julie Cohen has
also written about “the emergence of vast and lucrative new markets organized
around data collection and predictive profiling.”94 Cohen has labeled this the
“personal data economy.”95
Information capitalism, the personal data economy, and surveillance capitalism
are relevant to a discussion of post-truth information regulation in two key respects.
First, of course, they describe the accumulation of vast stores of information by
private actors—information that sheds light on aspects of human flourishing, truth
seeking, and democratic self-government. The one-sided accumulation of empirical
data by a subset of actors—call them Information Haves—means that evidencebased reasoning is richly possible for Information Haves in ways that it is not
possible for the rest—the Information Have-Nots. The Information Haves possess
reams of data and inputs that can be measured and analyzed quantitatively, as well
as the financial and technological resources to accomplish this analysis. The HaveNots lack the information, as well as the means to make use of it.
Thus, in any sort of market (or other) exchange between Information Haves and
Have-Nots, the Haves enjoy significant informational advantages that are, by
definition, evidence based. Surveillance capitalism thus provides the basis for a
major decision-making asymmetry, in which Information Haves enjoy enhanced
evidence-based decision-making, while Information Have-Nots experience an
informational disadvantage that limits the extent to which they can benefit from
evidence-based reasoning. The Have-Nots are consigned to modes of decisionmaking that we recognize as post-truth.
Secondly, both Cohen and Zuboff emphasize that the information economy
monetizes probabilistic information about our decisions. Its purpose is not merely to
observe decision-making, but to influence it.96 This, too, connects directly to post-

92. Shoshana Zuboff, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 11 (2019) (“Surveillance
capitalists know everything about us, whereas their operations are designed to be unknowable
to us. They accumulate vast domains of new knowledge from us, but not for us.”).
93. Id. at 379.
94. Julie E. Cohen, Property and the Construction of the Information Economy: A NeoPolanyian Ontology, in HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION (Leah Lievrouw
& Brian Loader eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 9) (on file with Indiana Law Journal).
95. Id.
96. Cohen, supra note 94; Zuboff, supra note 92, at 8 (Surveillance capitalism “claims
human experience as free raw material for translation into behavioral data” which is
“fabricated into prediction products that anticipate what you will do now, soon, and later”;
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truthism’s normative goals. Post-truthism’s aim is not merely to enforce a system of
information values, but to construct an information ecosystem that serves existing
powerful actors through its influence on decision makers. Surveillance capitalism
likewise seeks to construct an information ecosystem that serves the interests of those
with the financial resources to buy predictive analytics and to use them to influence
individuals’ decision-making. Insofar as it focuses on communicating information to
influence individuals’ behavior, information capitalism shares something in common
with post-truthism.
One reason that the political dimensions of compelled speech law matter is that
they help explain why post-truth ideas have gained purchase in some courts. Posttruth analysis is not just a convenient shortcut to outcomes in which companies save
disclosure costs, although disclosers often seek to frame the issue in those terms.97
Even beyond cost-benefit analysis, post-truthism weakens First Amendment
principles that have shored up democracy for two hundred years, but which tend to
threaten the informational hegemony of powerful economic actors. Post-truthism
suggests that the First Amendment can favor one type of decision-making over
another, that rational decision-making lacks value, and that, in a marketplace of
ideas, people do not really need exposure to a full range of information and claims.98
What these powerful economic actors understand is that information asymmetry rigs
the system in their favor.
III. POST-TRUTH DOCTRINE
Since 1985, when the Supreme Court decided Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, lower federal courts have interpreted the case
to justify laxer scrutiny for disclosures of “purely factual and uncontroversial”
commercial information.99 To do this, courts have improvised legal tests that focus
on a disclosure’s informational value to its recipients. The effect has been to raise
the bar for disclosure of “controversial” information—information that a court
imagines would shed light on a public controversy. 100
This Part starts by describing the mechanisms of Zauderer review. Many lower
federal courts deciding a First Amendment challenge to a commercial disclosure
mandate interpret Zauderer to require a controversial/uncontroversial test at the front

“automated machine processes not only know our behavior but also shape our behavior at
scale.”).
97. Indeed, some disclosure mandates, such as the Conflict Minerals Rule, enacted by
Congress as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, are
subject to formal regulatory agency procedures that evaluate the costs and benefits of the
disclosures. See Jeff Schwartz & Alexandrea Nelson, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Conflict
Minerals Rule, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 287 (2016).
98. For an enlightening discussion of how First Amendment law might constructively
address such issues in light of cognitive science, see Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 421–25 (2014).
99. 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
100. See infra Section III.B.
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end of the First Amendment analysis.101 The Supreme Court’s most recent compelled
speech case, NIFLA v. Becerra, did nothing to disapprove that approach and could
easily be read to endorse it.102
What does “controversial” mean? A second subsection looks closely at how these
courts have defined “controversial” and “uncontroversial” disclosures. It shows that
courts use different definitions: most interpret “controversial” to mean “related to a
controversy,” but others interpret it to mean “contested,” “not verifiable,” or “not
true.” It argues that, particularly in cases finding a First Amendment violation or a
likelihood of a First Amendment violation, courts treat controversiality as a measure
of disclosure function, with attention to whether the disclosure is likely to influence
its audience. In other words, in the Zauderer context, “controversial” often means
subversive.
A. Commercial Compelled Speech & Zauderer
When a plaintiff challenges a commercial disclosure mandate, intermediate
review is the default. Like restrictions on commercial speech, compelled commercial
speech is subject to review using the test established in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission in 1980.103 Under Central
Hudson, a law that compels a commercial disclosure must “directly advance[]” a
“substantial” governmental interest and not be “more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.”104
In 1985, the Supreme Court departed from the Central Hudson standard and
applied less exacting scrutiny to a disclosure mandate in Zauderer.105 Zauderer
involved disclaimers triggered by statements in print advertisements. The concern
was that attorney advertisements that promoted contingent fee arrangements were
deceptive unless they also contained specific information about how costs would be
charged. Rather than apply intermediate scrutiny to the ad disclosure, the Zauderer
Court devised a “reasonable relation” test, explaining that:

101. The Ninth Circuit recently clarified that the controversiality test can come after an
evaluation of the disclosure’s justification and burden on speech. See Am. Bev. Ass’n v. City
& Cty. of S.F., 916 F.3d 749, 756 (9th Cir. 2019). The Eighth Circuit offers an exception; it
does not routinely employ controversiality tests to determine the proper standard of review.
See 1-800-411-Pain Referral Serv., LLC v. Otto, 744 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Disc.
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 n.8 (6th Cir. 2012)
(suggesting that the Supreme Court likely did not mean to make “purely factual and
noncontroversial” a legal standard).
102. 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (the licensed notice is not limited to “purely factual and
uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . services will be available”).
103. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,
500 n.9 (1996).
104. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The Central Hudson test applies only to commercial
speech that is lawful and not misleading. Id.
105. 471 U.S. at 626, 651.
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[t]he State has attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox in
commercial advertising, and its prescription has taken the form of a
requirement that appellant include in his advertising purely factual and
uncontroversial information about the terms under which his services
will be available. Because the extension of First Amendment protection
to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers
of the information such speech provides, appellant’s constitutionally
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in
his advertising is minimal.106
Since 1985, and particularly in the last ten years, lower courts have applied
Zauderer’s “reasonable relation” review to an increasing scope of informationforcing regulation.107 Courts often cite the case in connection with disclosure
mandates that require businesses to reveal data about their products and services, for
example.108
What is most noteworthy about Zauderer is the great significance courts have
given the phrase “purely factual and uncontroversial” in the passage quoted above. 109
Today, nearly every application of the Zauderer test to a commercial disclosure
involves judicial inquiry into whether the disclosure is “factual” and
“uncontroversial.”110

106. Id. (citations omitted).
107. Under Zauderer’s “reasonable relation” test, “an advertiser’s rights are adequately
protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in
preventing deception of consumers.” Id. Robert Post has described Zauderer review as “an
extraordinarily lenient test.” Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled
Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and
Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 560 (2006).
108. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009)
(chain restaurants must disclose calorie information about their food products); Mass. Ass’n
of Private Career Sch. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D. Mass. 2016) (for-profit colleges
must disclose graduation rate and employment rate data).
109. See Rebecca Tushnet, COOL Story: Country of Origin Labeling and the First
Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 25, 32 (2015) (describing Zauderer’s “purely factual and
uncontroversial” standard as “an independent prerequisite for constitutionality” in Am. Meat
Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
110. See, e.g., Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F. (ABA 2019), 916 F.3d 749, 756
(9th Cir. 2019) (The “Zauderer test . . . contains three inquiries: whether the notice is (1) purely
factual, (2) noncontroversial, and (3) not unjustified or unduly burdensome.”); Poughkeepsie
Supermarket Corp. v. Dutchess Cty., 648 F. App’x 156, 158 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Because Local
Law No. 9 requires only the disclosure of purely factual and uncontroversial information—
namely, item pricing,” it qualified for Zauderer review.); Cigar Ass'n of Am. v. U.S. FDA,
315 F. Supp. 3d 143, 165 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Zauderer applies only to disclosures of ‘purely
factual and uncontroversial information about the good or service being offered.’ The court
therefore must first determine whether the disclosures are ‘purely factual’ and
‘uncontroversial.’”); Nat’l Ass’n of Wheat Growers v. Zeise, 309 F. Supp. 3d 842, 852 (E.D.
Cal. 2018) (“The dispute in the present case is over whether the compelled disclosure is of
purely factual and uncontroversial information.”); Core-Mark Int'l, Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of
Livestock, No. CV 15-05-H-SEH, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187359, at *10 (D. Mont. Nov. 1,
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Zauderer leaves open a number of vexing and important questions. 111 The most
vigorous disagreement over Zauderer so far has concerned what kinds of commercial
disclosure mandates are subject to its laxer review.112 In the narrow view, the
Zauderer test applies only where a commercial disclosure is “purely factual and
uncontroversial” and functions to prevent consumer deception.113 In a somewhat
broader view, Zauderer applies to any commercial disclosure mandate—but cannot

2018) (compelled disclosure of product sell-by date “does not constitute an opinion, and
cannot reasonably be considered controversial”); Mass. Ass’n of Private Career Sch. v.
Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d 173, 197 (D. Mass. 2016) (“Zauderer reasonable-basis review is
applicable . . . if two conditions are met: (1) the speech is potentially misleading and (2) the
regulations require the schools to disclose factual and uncontroversial information.”). But see
1-800-411-Pain Referral Serv., LLC v. Otto, 744 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 2014); Disc. Tobacco
City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 n.8 (6th Cir. 2012).
111. See, e.g., Amarei v. City of Chicago, No. 13 C 2805, 2015 WL 7251940, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 17, 2015) (arguing that “Zauderer is not a form of rational basis review”); Grocery
Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 633–34 (D. Vt. 2015) (expressing uncertainty
about whether Zauderer requires a “substantial” governmental interest); Note, Repackaging
Zauderer, 130 HARV. L. REV. 972, 973 (2017) (“[C]ircuits have split on both Zauderer’s reach
. . . and its form . . . .”). The Supreme Court has addressed mandatory disclosure in only a few
cases since it decided Zauderer in 1985. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P. A. v. United
States, 559 U.S. 229, 253 (2010) (upholding disclosure mandate that forced law firm to
identify itself as a debt-relief agency as “reasonably related to the [Government’s] interest in
preventing deception of consumers”) (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651); Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (“Although the
State may at times ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising’ by requiring
the dissemination of ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information,’ outside that context it
may not compel affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees . . . . [T]his general
rule . . . applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to
statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid . . . .”) (internal citations omitted); Pac. Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 15–16 n.12 (1986); see also Ellen P. Goodman,
Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the Constitutional Meaning of Graphic
Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 518 (2014) (noting that commercial disclosure law “is
not well developed”).
112. A few judges would draw the line between commercial speech restrictions and
commercial disclosure. In a 2011 case involving both types of regulation, the Fifth Circuit
applied Central Hudson to the speech restrictions and Zauderer to the disclosure mandates.
Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212, 219, 227 (5th Cir. 2011);
see also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Srinivasan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that regulations restricting commercial speech should get Central Hudson
review, but that regulations compelling “truthful commercial information” should receive
Zauderer review).
113. See, e.g., Bulldog Inv’rs Gen. P’ship v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 953 N.E.2d 691,
705 (Mass. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 987 (2012). Even for courts that have adopted this
interpretation of Zauderer, there is disagreement about whether Zauderer review applies only
to commercial speech that is “inherently” misleading, or also to speech that is “potentially”
misleading. See, e.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 641 (6th Cir. 2010);
Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 196.
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be satisfied unless the disclosure is factual and uncontroversial. 114 The D.C. Circuit
initially refused to apply the Zauderer test outside the consumer deception context,115
but changed its mind in 2014 when reviewing a country-of-origin labeling law for
meat products.116 It later changed its view of Zauderer’s scope again, holding that
Zauderer review applies only to “purely factual and uncontroversial” compelled
speech in “voluntary advertising.” 117 The Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in NIFLA
v. Becerra calls this interpretation into question by describing Zauderer’s scope as
extending to “purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about commercial
products.”118
The Ninth Circuit has taken a different tack. In 2012, in a case reviewing a law
that required cell phone sellers to disclose radiofrequency energy emissions
information to purchasers of cell phones, the Ninth Circuit applied lax Zauderer
review.119 However, it held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their
claim that the disclosure law violated the First Amendment because, the Ninth
Circuit asserted, Zauderer requires that “any governmentally compelled disclosures
to consumers must be ‘purely factual and uncontroversial,’” and the radiofrequency
energy emissions disclosures failed this test.120 In other words, instead of reading the
phrase “purely factual and uncontroversial” as helping to define the scope of
commercial speech to which Zauderer review will apply, the Ninth Circuit treated
“purely factual and uncontroversial” as a standard that must be met to satisfy
Zauderer review.121
Other federal courts routinely interpret Zauderer to require a controversiality test.
For example, in 2016, the Second Circuit applied Zauderer review to a law requiring

114. CTIA-Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 494 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2012).
115. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (NAM 2014), 748 F.3d 359, 371 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
116. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
117. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 524 n.14 (quoting United States v. United Foods,
Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 416 (2001)).
118. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376
(2018). The statement could be characterized as dicta because NIFLA concerned the provision
of services and not “commercial products.” However, the phrase “disclosures about
commercial products” would seem to extend beyond “voluntary advertising.” Elsewhere in
the same opinion, Justice Thomas described Zauderer as applying “more deferential review to
some laws that require professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their
‘commercial speech.’” Id. at 2372. Although this, too, could be read to extend Zauderer’s
scope beyond “voluntary advertising,” it also might be understood to require that the speaker
be a “professional.” Since professionals typically produce services, not “commercial
products,” however, it is difficult to understand the majority’s view of Zauderer’s scope of
application.
119. CTIA–Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 494 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2012).
120. Id. at 753.
121. The Ninth Circuit again endorsed this approach in 2017 in American Beverage
Association v. City and County of San Francisco (ABA 2017), 871 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2017),
and upon rehearing en banc in 2019. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F. (ABA 2019),
916 F.3d 749, 756 (9th Cir. 2019).
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price stickers on items sold at retail.122 But it did so only after concluding that price
stickers involve “only the disclosure of purely factual and uncontroversial
information—namely, item pricing—about the retailer’s own goods.”123 In 2015, a
federal court in Illinois applied Zauderer review to a Chicago ordinance requiring
tax preparers to make disclosures to customers.124 After deciding that Zauderer’s
“reasonable relation” test governed, the court held that Zauderer was satisfied
because “the required disclosures contain only the sort of uncontroversial factual
information that Zauderer contemplated.”125
In 2018, in NIFLA v. Becerra, a case concerning mandatory disclosures for crisis
pregnancy centers, the Supreme Court briefly discussed controversiality as a basis
for determining the correct standard of review of disclosure laws targeting licensed
clinics and unlicensed centers.126 Writing for a 5–4 majority, Justice Thomas
declined to apply Zauderer review to the licensed clinic disclosure on the ground that
the disclosure was “not limited to ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information
about the terms under which . . . services will be available.’” 127 The disclosure was
not so limited, Justice Thomas explained, because the it concerned “state-sponsored
services” rather than “services that licensed clinics provide,” and because it required
the disclosure of information about “abortion, anything but an ‘uncontroversial’
topic.”128 In other words, the majority treated controversiality as at least partially
determinative of the level of scrutiny it would apply to a compelled speech law.
Lower federal courts already have begun to interpret NIFLA v. Becerra as an
endorsement of controversiality tests to determine whether a disclosure mandate is
entitled to lax Zauderer review.129
As this suggests, in the Zauderer framework, the question of whether a
commercial disclosure mandate is “purely factual and uncontroversial” is
consequential, and sometimes outcome determinative.130 It is a test with teeth.

122. Poughkeepsie Supermarket Corp. v. Dutchess Cty., 648 F. App’x 156, 157 (2d Cir.
2016) (summary order).
123. Id. at 158.
124. Amarei v. City of Chicago, No. 13 C 2805, 2015 WL 7251940, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
17, 2015).
125. Id. at *3. In applying Zauderer’s “reasonable relation” test, the court also considered
whether the disclosures “further[ed] the City’s goal of preventing tax preparers from taking
advantage of customers” and concluded that they did. Id.
126. 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018).
127. Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F. (ABA 2019), 916 F.3d 749, 756
(9th Cir. 2019) (“The Zauderer test, as applied in NIFLA, contains three inquiries: whether the
notice is (1) purely factual, (2) noncontroversial, and (3) not unjustified or unduly burdensome.
A compelled disclosure accompanying a related product or service must meet all three criteria
to be constitutional.”) (citing NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018)).
130. See, e.g., Mass. Ass’n of Private Career Sch. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d 173, 197 (D.
Mass. 2016) (stating that a “condition” for Zauderer review to apply is that the information be
“factual and uncontroversial”); Amarei v. City of Chicago, No. 13 C 2805, 2015 WL 7251940,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2015) (applying Zauderer review to commercial disclosures of
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B. Disclosure Controversial
What makes a disclosure controversial? The circuits disagree. 131 Lower courts
applying Zauderer most commonly use “controversial” to mean that the disclosure
information relates to a public controversy. For example, in National Association of
Manufacturers (“NAM”) v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit suggested that a controversial
disclosure is anything related to a “controversy” or a “dispute, especially a public
one.”132 The Second Circuit reached essentially the same conclusion in Evergreen
Association v. City of New York, treating a disclosure about whether a clinic provides
particular health services as “controversial” because it required clinics to “mention”
a “controversial” subject.133
Until its decision in NIFLA v. Becerra in 2018, the Supreme Court had never used
controversiality as a basis to reject Zauderer review for a disclosure law.134 In
NIFLA, one challenged disclosure was a statement that “California has public
programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family
planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal
care, and abortion for eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, contact the
county social services office at [telephone number].”135 This information was
nonideological and presumably accurate, but the Court refused to apply Zauderer
review because, it said, the disclosure contained “information about” services
“including abortion, anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.”136 This phrasing
expressed a very broad view of controversiality, essentially construing it to mean that
a disclosure cannot be “uncontroversial” if it relates to a controversial topic.
Importantly, these courts’ use of “controversial” is broader than the dictionary
definition of the word; “controversial” is generally defined to mean “[g]iving rise or

“uncontroversial factual information,” including a list of services provided by a tax preparer
and the prices of the services, the “estimated time a customer can expect to receive a [tax]
refund, and a short certification statement”).
131. See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 34 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t is unclear how we should assess and what we should examine to determine
whether a mandatory disclosure is controversial.”); id. at 54 (Brown, J., dissenting) (“[W]hat is or
is not controversial will lie in the eye of the beholder.”).
132. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (NAM 2015), 800 F.3d 518, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Although National Association of Manufacturers concluded that Zauderer review did not
apply, it provided a detailed analysis of the disclosure under Zauderer as an alternative
holding. Id. at 532–33.
133. 740 F.3d 233, 245 n.6 (2d Cir. 2014). Evergreen Association is discussed at greater
length in Part V. In that opinion, the Second Circuit held that the challenged disclosures were
not commercial speech, but it offered an analysis “[a]ssuming arguendo” that they were
commercial speech. Id. It concluded that Zauderer would not apply on the sole basis that the
disclosures were not “purely factual and uncontroversial.” Id.
134. 138 S. Ct. at 2372. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text, explaining that
controversiality was one of two reasons the Court refused to apply Zauderer review to the
licensed clinic disclosure.
135. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2369.
136. Id. at 2372.
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likely to give rise to controversy or public disagreement.”137 That is, a “controversial
disclosure” in the dictionary sense is a disclosure that causes controversy. A
“controversial disclosure” in the Zauderer sense is a disclosure related to a
controversy.
These courts’ expansive definition of “controversial” suggests that any
information that tends to shed light on a matter of public debate is ineligible for
Zauderer review. Other courts have suggested that a disclosure is controversial if it
is contested,138 not verifiable,139 or likely to be “misinterpreted by consumers.”140
Plaintiffs seeking to extend the definition have argued that a commercial disclosure
is controversial if it is “inflammatory” 141 or “sensitive.”142
Some courts have concluded that “factual” and “uncontroversial” mean the same
thing. For example, in 2015, a federal district court applied the Zauderer test to a
Vermont state law mandating labels for products created with the use of genetic
engineering, but only after concluding that the information disclosed was not
“controversial.”143 Somewhat cryptically, the court explained that “before compelled
commercial information is deemed ‘controversial,’ the compelled information must,
itself, be ‘controversial.’”144 The court’s opinion included a seven-paragraph
subsection analyzing whether the challenged law required the disclosure of
“controversial” information.145 Ultimately the court concluded that because the
Vermont law’s “disclosure requirement mandates the disclosure of only factual
information—whether a food product contains [genetically engineered]

137. Controversial,
ENG.
OXFORD
LIVING
DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/controversial [https://perma.cc/LP3E-U33M].
138. See infra notes 148–71 and accompanying text.
139. See also Core-Mark Int'l, Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Livestock, No. CV 15-05-H-SEH, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187359, at *10 (D. Mont. Nov. 1, 2018) (product sell-by date was “definite
and determinable” and therefore uncontroversial).
140. Cigar Ass’n of Am. v. U.S. FDA, 315 F. Supp. 3d 143, 165–66 (D.D.C. 2018) (“A
disclosure is ‘controversial,’ the court gathers, when it is ‘subject to misinterpretation by
consumers,’ or ‘inflammatory.’”); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Wheat Growers v. Zeise, 309 F.
Supp. 3d 842, 851 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (disclosure was controversial because it was “misleading
to the ordinary consumer”).
141. Cigar Ass’n of Am., 315 F. Supp. 3d at 165–66.
142. In two cases decided in 2012 and 2017, respectively, the Ninth Circuit arrived at
different outcomes regarding similar disclosure mandates by changing its interpretation of the
word “controversial.” Compare CTIA–Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 494 F. App’x
752, 753–54 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that radiofrequency energy disclosures were “misleading
and controversial”), with CTIA–Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th
Cir. 2017) (“‘[U]ncontroversial’ in [the Zauderer] context refers to the factual accuracy of the
compelled disclosure, not to its subjective impact on the audience.”).
143. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 628–30 (D. Vt. 2015).
144. Id. at 628.
145. Id. at 628–30.
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ingredients— . . . it does not require the disclosure of ‘controversial’ information.” 146
In the court’s view, information that is factual cannot also be controversial.147
The D.C. Circuit disagreed in NAM v. SEC. Since the Supreme Court linked the
two terms conjunctively in Zauderer, that court reasoned, “‘uncontroversial,’ as a
legal test, must mean something different than ‘purely factual.’” 148 In NAM v. SEC,
a trade association of manufacturers challenged a mandatory disclosure of corporate
social responsibility information, the Conflict Minerals Rule. 149 The Rule, enacted
by Congress as a provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, required a subset of companies regulated by the SEC to make
disclosures related to their use of certain minerals in their manufacture of goods. 150
Manufacturers that sourced these minerals from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the surrounding area, or that could not identify the origin of the minerals
they used, were required to disclose in reports filed with the SEC, and separately on
their company websites, that the products were not “DRC conflict free.” 151
The D.C. Circuit twice refused to analyze the Rule as a securities disclosure
(which would have subjected the Rule, at most, to rational basis review152), declined
to apply Zauderer’s “reasonable relation” test, and ultimately held that either the

146. Id. at 630. Earlier in the opinion, the district court had also stated:
A manufacturer who is required to disclose whether its products contain certain
ingredients is not compelled to make a political statement even if such a
statement “links a product to a current public debate” because “many, if not most,
products may be tied to public concerns with the environment, energy, economic
policy, or individual health and safety.”
Id. at 622 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
562–63 n.5 (1980)). An appeal of the case to the Second Circuit was dropped.
147. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA provides another example. In the case, the D.C.
Circuit concluded that compelled images “primarily intended to evoke an emotional response”
were not “purely factual.” 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part by Am.
Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). However, the
court’s explanation revealed that it really meant that the graphic images were not
“uncontroversial” (i.e., the images were sensational and designed, in the court’s word, to
“shock”). Id. at 1213–17.
148. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
149. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
78m(p) (2012); Conflict Minerals, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13p-1, 249b.400 (2018).
150. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56724, 56275-6 (Sept. 12, 2012). These “conflict
minerals,” gold, tantalum, tin, and tungsten, are primarily used in the manufacture of
electronics. See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56283–84 (describing common uses of the
four minerals); Marcia Narine, From Kansas to the Congo: Why Naming and Shaming
Corporations Through the Dodd-Frank Act’s Corporate Governance Disclosure Won’t Solve
a Human Rights Crisis, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 351, 359 (2013).
151. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (NAM 2014), 748 F.3d 359, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
152. See id. at 371–72 (discussing whether securities disclosure would receive rational
basis review). The D.C. Circuit agreed to rehear the case to determine whether its decision in
Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014), required a different result.
See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (NAM 2015), 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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Central Hudson test or strict scrutiny applied.153 In an opinion concluding that part
of the Rule violated the First Amendment, the D.C. Circuit suggested that the
disclosure was not “factual” because “[p]roducts and minerals do not fight
conflicts.”154 The court interpreted Zauderer’s “purely factual” language as a basis
for fine-grained semantic quibbling.
Upon rehearing, the D.C. Circuit devoted several paragraphs to Zauderer’s
“purely factual and uncontroversial” standard, offering its analysis as an alternative
ground for its holding invalidating part of the disclosure mandate. 155 It rejected the
idea that Zauderer’s “uncontroversial” test should be interpreted to draw a line
between fact and opinion because, it said, the fact-opinion distinction is “often
blurred.”156 The court mused:
Is Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity fact or opinion, and should it
be regarded as controversial? If the government required labels on all
internal combustion engines stating that “USE OF THIS PRODUCT
CONTRIBUTES TO GLOBAL WARMING” would that be fact or
opinion? It is easy to convert many statements of opinion into assertions
of fact simply by removing the words “in my opinion” or removing “in
the opinion of many scientists” or removing “in the opinion of many
experts.” It is also the case that propositions once regarded as factual and
uncontroversial may turn out to be something quite different. 157
This, of course, is the Fact-Opinion Ploy, discussed in Part II above.158 It is the
post-truth idea that facts and opinions are essentially the same thing, an argument
typically used to suggest that facts are equally as trustworthy as opinions, and
therefore should not be valued more highly than opinions in decision-making.159
The court could have said that a fact-opinion distinction is not useful in this
context—an approach the Supreme Court has taken in the law of defamation,
securities fraud, and other compelled speech cases160—but it chose instead to

153. NAM 2015, 800 F.3d at 524. The district court had applied Central Hudson. Nat’l
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43, 73 (D.D.C. 2013).
154. NAM 2015, 800 F.3d at 530 (quoting NAM 2014, 748 F.3d at 371). The court
concluded that part of the Rule failed the Central Hudson test, and thus violated the First
Amendment. Upon rehearing, the court expressly adopted the reasoning from its first opinion
on that subject. Id. at 524.
155. Id. at 524–30.
156. Id. at 528.
157. Id. (citations omitted).
158. The D.C. Circuit’s use of post-truth tropes in this opinion was overt. In a footnote, for
example, the majority expressly referenced a passage from George Orwell’s book, Nineteen
Eighty-Four. See id. at 530 n.29.
159. In 2018, in Janus v. AFSCME, the Supreme Court labeled “climate change” a
“controversial subject[],” thereby laying the ground work for any future challenge to a
disclosure mandate related to “climate change” or, as the D.C. Circuit put it in the quoted
passage, “global warming.” 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2476 (2018).
160. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text; Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487
U.S. 781, 797–98 (1988) (“These cases cannot be distinguished simply because they involved

1384

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:1351

challenge the value of the supply chain information that the rule required to be
disclosed. In an earlier opinion, the D.C. Circuit had expressed skepticism that
investors factor information about the origin of conflict minerals into their decisionmaking at all, reflecting the judges’ own subjective view about the kinds of
information that investors should use in their investment and shareholding
decisions.161 The D.C. Circuit’s articulation of the Fact-Opinion Ploy in NAM v. SEC
is a striking judicial expression of a post-truth idiom commonly used to undermine
fact-based reasoning.162
The other main thread of post-truth rhetoric discussed in Part II, the Alternative
Facts Thesis, influences another commonly used definition of “controversial.”
Courts applying Zauderer often imply that “uncontroversial” means uncontested, or
sometimes true.163 An important example is the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of a
mandatory warning for sugar-sweetened beverages in American Beverage
Association v. City and County of San Francisco.164 The case challenged on First
Amendment grounds a San Francisco ordinance that required advertisements for
sugar-sweetened beverages within the city to bear this warning: “WARNING:
Drinking beverages with added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth
decay. This is a message from the City and County of San Francisco.”165 In 2017, a
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit, applying Zauderer review, began its review
of the disclosure by addressing the “controversy” question. It characterized this

compelled statements of opinion while here we deal with compelled statements of ‘fact’: either
form of compulsion burdens protected speech.”).
161. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (NAM 2014), 748 F.3d 359, 370–372 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(“[T]he ‘conflict free’ label is not employed to sell securities.”).
162. In American Meat Institute (AMI) v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, a trade
association of meat producers challenged a federal country-of-origin labeling law. 760 F.3d
18, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Secretary of Agriculture had required disclosure of the location
of each step in the production of meat products, including the location of an animal’s
“slaughter.” The AMI argued that the disclosure was “controversial” because the word
“slaughter” was objectionable. See id. at 27. Rather than dismiss this idea out of hand, the D.C.
Circuit conceded that the word “‘slaughter’ . . . might convey a certain innuendo,” but declined
to throw out the disclosure on that basis, since the rule allowed retailers to substitute the word
“harvested,” which the trade association had not objected to. Id. A year later, however, the
D.C. Circuit expressed a change of heart about the case:
A controversy, the dictionaries tell us, is a dispute, especially a public one. Was
there a dispute about the country-of-origin [meat packaging] disclosures in AMI
or as AMI put it, was there a controversy “for some reason other than [a] dispute
about simple factual accuracy”? One would think the answer surely was yes.
NAM 2015, 800 F.3d at 529 (citations omitted).
163. See, e.g., Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 779 F. Supp. 2d 456, 471 (D. Md.
2011) (upholding a disclosure mandate that “in neutral language states the truth”), rev’d in
part, 683 F.3d 591 (4th Cir. 2012), aff’d en banc, 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013) (affirming the
district court).
164. 871 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 2017).
165. Id. (quoting S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE § 4203(a) (2015)).
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question as “whether the ‘inherent character’ of the compelled disclosure is ‘purely
factual and uncontroversial’ under Zauderer.”166 It found it was not, explaining that:
[T]he factual accuracy of the warning is, at a minimum, controversial as
that term is used in the Zauderer framework. The warning provides the
unqualified statement that “[d]rinking beverages with added sugar(s)
contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay,” and therefore conveys
the message that sugar-sweetened beverages contribute to these health
conditions regardless of the quantity consumed or other lifestyle choices.
This is contrary to statements by the [Food and Drug Administration
(FDA)] that added sugars are “generally recognized as safe,” and “can
be a part of a healthy dietary pattern when not consumed in excess
amounts.”167
The court’s logic was faulty: the notion that added sugars contribute to obesity,
diabetes, and tooth decay is not contradicted by a statement that added sugars are
“generally recognized as safe,”168 unless obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay make a
person unsafe. More to the point, a warning that drinking beverages with added
sugars contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay would not be understood by
a reasonable consumer to mean that every person who consumes sugar-sweetened
beverages will develop those ailments. A food can both be “safe,” in the sense that it
will not immediately sicken a person who consumes it, and contribute to long-term
health problems.
In the case, the Ninth Circuit presented the FDA’s statements, and similar
statements from the American Dental Association, as creating a dispute or
controversy about the health effects of sugar-sweetened beverages.169 It then asserted
that the existence of the dispute (i.e., conflicting statements presented to the court in
litigation) made “the factual accuracy of the warning . . . controversial.” 170 This
approach neatly marries a common post-truth argument with Zauderer review. It
suggests that contestation itself renders information unreliable, and that this is
disqualifying under Zauderer. In other words, when parties present conflicting
information about a disclosure in litigation, the disclosure becomes controversial. 171
Under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, this meant the disclosure failed Zauderer
review.
In January 2019, the Ninth Circuit reheard American Beverage Association v. City
and County of San Francisco en banc and again concluded that the American
Beverage Association was likely to succeed on its claim that the sugar-sweetened

166. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco (ABA 2017), 871 F.3d at
895 (citation omitted).
167. Id. (citations omitted).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 896. Unlike the FDA, which is a governmental agency, the American Dental
Association is a private, nonprofit association of dentists. About the ADA, ADA
https://www.ada.org/en/about-the-ada [https://perma.cc/R53N-5UTV].
170. ABA 2017, 871 F.3d at 895.
171. As discussed in Part II, the view that contestation itself renders information
untrustworthy or unreliable is the Alternative Facts Thesis. See supra Section I.B.
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beverage warning violated the First Amendment. 172 This time, however, the court
not only treated Zauderer’s “purely factual and uncontroversial” language as two
parts of a three-part “Zauderer test,”173 but expressly declined to reach the question
of whether the sugar-sweetened bevearage warning was “purely factual” or
“noncontroversial.”174 Instead, the court started its application of the Zauderer test
by asking whether the disclosure was “not unjustified or unduly burdensome” and
concluded that, because the disclosure failed this third prong of the test, it could stop
there in its analysis.175 A dissent, joined by the Chief Judge, argued that the analysis
should have started with the factual/uncontroversial inquiry: “where, as here, the
parties disagree about the veracity of compelled speech, the court should begin by
asking whether the government’s message is objectively true.” 176 The dissenters
concluded that the sugar-sweetened beverage warning was not “objectively true”
because it used the word “diabetes,” and though sugar consumption has been linked
to the development of type 2 diabetes, the causes of type 1 diabetes are unknown. 177
In Evergreen Association, the Second Circuit also suggested that contested
information is controversial.178 In a decision enjoining the disclosure that “the New
York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene encourages women who are or
who may be pregnant to consult with a licensed provider,” the Second Circuit wrote:
“It may be the case that most, if not all, pregnancy services centers would agree that
pregnant women should see a doctor. That decision, however, as this litigation
demonstrates, is a public issue subject to dispute.”179 Because a litigant challenged
the idea that pregnant women should consult a doctor, the court labeled the idea
disputed—and described it, a few sentences later, as a “contested public issue.” 180
The challenger’s decision to dispute the disclosure was the factor driving its First
Amendment treatment.181
On this reasoning, litigation itself becomes a process to transform a disclosure
into a contested public issue.182 The maneuver imports into the doctrine the idea that

172. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F. (ABA 2019), 916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2019).
173. Id. at 756 (“The Zauderer test, as applied in NIFLA, contains three inquiries: whether
the notice is (1) purely factual, (2) noncontroversial, and (3) not unjustified or unduly
burdensome.”).
174. Id. at 757.
175. Id. (“We need not, and therefore do not, decide whether the warning here is factually
accurate and noncontroversial.”).
176. Id. at 765 (Christen, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 765–67.
178. Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014).
179. Id. at 250.
180. Id. at 250–51.
181. The Second Circuit held that this disclosure mandate, and two others, were not
commercial speech. Even so, in the course of applying intermediate and strict scrutiny to the
disclosure mandates, it analyzed their controversiality. Separately, the court concluded that if
the disclosure mandates were commercial speech, they were not “uncontroversial,” and thus
Zauderer would not apply. Id. at 245 n.6.
182. But see Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 622 (D. Vt. 2015)
(“[O]bjection and opposition, no matter however vehement, do not, without more, convert a
disclosure requirement about a food product into a political statement.”).
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contestation is as powerful a signal of information value as the underlying merits. As
a federal court put it in a 2016 product warning case:
A “controversy” cannot be created any time there is a disagreement
between the parties because Zauderer would never apply, especially
where there are health and safety risks, which invariably are dependent
in some degree on the current state of science and research. A
“controversy” cannot automatically be deemed created any time there is
a disagreement about the science behind a warning because science is
almost always debatable at some level (e.g., even if there is agreement
that there is a safety issue, there is likely disagreement about at what
point a safety concern is fairly implicated).183
Notably, in Janus v. AFSCME in 2018, Justice Alito’s majority opinion made a
point of listing “controversial subjects” such as “climate change[,] . . . sexual
orientation and gender identity, [and] evolution,” all topics of extensive scientific
research and consensus.184 Whatever Zauderer means, it cannot be that compelled
speech is fatally “controversial” because an unwilling speaker targeted by a
disclosure law says the speech is controversial.
It is particularly interesting that the message enjoined in Evergreen Association
merely advised pregnant women to “consult with” additional, credible sources of
information (licensed physicians). 185 The purpose of the city ordinance was to
encourage information seeking by pregnant women, without regard to political
ideology. Yet the court suggested that the City could not constitutionally require a
health clinic to post a sign encouraging information seeking because the whole
subject of women’s reproductive health is a public issue and thus controversial. 186 In
the similar disclosure mandate at issue in NIFLA v. Becerra, the disclosure message
also merely encouraged information seeking.187 There was no inquiry into speech
chilling, the deterrence of other protected interests, or the expression of ideology or
viewpoint; the disclosure’s relation to a hotly contested public issue sufficed to defeat
it.

183. CTIA–Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 158 F. Supp. 3d 897, 904 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
184. 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2476 (2018).
185. Evergreen Ass’n, 740 F.3d at 250.
186. In Massachusetts Association of Private Career Schools v. Healey, a federal district
court engaged in fine-grained analysis of four separate disclosure mandates to determine
whether each was uncontroversial. 159 F. Supp. 3d 173, 197 (D. Mass 2016). For example,
the plaintiff challenged the application of Zauderer to a disclosure that “[f]ailure to repay
student loans is likely to have a serious negative effect on your . . . future earnings.” Id. The
court found the disclosure was appropriate for Zauderer review, observing that it “does not
appear to be a controversial proposition.” Id. It went on to apply Zauderer review to two of
the other three disclosure mandates, but rejected Zauderer review for a disclosure it found to
be partially false, which the court contended made it “not a factual disclosure.” Id. at 200.
187. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
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IV. POST-TRUTH VALUES
Why is this post-truth, or even problematic? In short, by treating controversiality
as a problem per se, the Zauderer approach calibrates the flow of disclosure
information based purely on how that information will affect its audience, and in
reverse—constricting the flow of useful information on matters of the highest public
interest. If the Zauderer framework did this incidentally while protecting other
constitutional interests—privacy rights, expressive interests, the right against selfincrimination, etc.—it might be justified. However, courts applying controversiality
tests are not primarily concerned with rights-deterrence; they are concerned about
the impact of the information. Implicit in this concern is the idea that some
information is uniquely dangerous or subversive in its effects. Where information
might upset the status quo, “controversiality” tests work to keep people in the dark.
A. The Problem of Speech Chilling
There are valid reasons to raise concerns about government-mandated disclosure
of controversial information. One is that forcing speakers to reveal facts about
themselves on controversial subjects might chill protected First Amendment
activity.188 Speakers may speak less, or speak differently, if they understand that
certain voluntary speech acts will cause them to have to reveal controversial
information about themselves that could subject them to public censure or
embarrassment. Two important First Amendment cases reveal the relationship
between controversiality, speech chilling, and free expression. They are NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson189 and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.190
NAACP v. Alabama was a civil-rights-era case in which Alabama sought to
compel the NAACP, a nonprofit corporation, to disclose the identities of its
members. The Supreme Court threw out Alabama’s compelled disclosure on First
Amendment grounds.191 The Court’s primary concern was the substantial burden it
said the disclosure mandate placed on the NAACP’s members’ exercise of rights: the
likelihood that it would “induce members to withdraw from the Association and
dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs . . . and of
the consequences of this exposure.”192 Those consequences included “economic
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of

188. In Healey, a federal court found that a mandated disclosure was false for some
speakers and observed that “if a disclosure . . . compels false speech, it can act as a speech
restriction. Specifically, if a speaker is faced with a choice between including a false disclosure
in an advertisement and not advertising at all, he may choose not to speak.” 159 F. Supp. 3d
at 206.
189. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
190. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
191. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462.
192. Id. at 463. After concluding that the burden on the NAACP’s members’ rights was
substantial, the Court found that “Alabama has fallen short of showing a controlling
justification for the deterrent effect” of the disclosure mandate on those rights. Id. at 466.
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public hostility.”193 Alabama’s interest in obtaining the disclosure did not justify the
“deterrent effect” the disclosure would have on the NAACP’s members’ exercise of
their right of association.194 The Court used the word “controversial” only once, in a
statement that verified the importance of that associational right. 195
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission addressed a disclosure law targeting an
individual rather than an organization. 196 Margaret McIntyre had distributed leaflets
at a local town meeting, expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. She
was charged with violating a provision of Ohio state law that required such leaflets
to identify the person who created them197 and fined $100.198 In discussing why the
law violated Mrs. McIntyre’s First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court described
the disclosure mandate as particularly “intrusive” because it “reveals unmistakably
the content of her thoughts on a controversial issue.” 199 The Court discussed how the
political leaflet was more “personal” and “provocative” than a political contribution
of money, noting that “when money supports an unpopular viewpoint it is less likely
to precipitate retaliation.”200 In its conclusion, the Court underscored this point using
strong language, observing that anonymous pamphleteering “exemplifies the
purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to
protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—
at the hand of an intolerant society.”201
In the Supreme Court’s analysis, the fact that her leaflet addressed a
“controversial” issue—a political matter that would be decided by an election—was
relevant because the Court worried that Mrs. McIntyre’s speech required protection
from a real threat of reprisal. In the Court’s use, “controversial” meant something
closer to the dictionary definition: not related to a public controversy, but causing
controversy, or provoking.
However, what was provocative about the pamphlet was Mrs. McIntyre’s views
about the tax levy, not the disclosure mandated by Ohio law. The Court was not
concerned about the controversiality of the disclosure; it was worried that the
disclosure would identify her as the author of a controversial pamphlet. The
disclosure of her identity would have made her a target for retaliation, thus increasing
the likelihood that she would choose, ex ante, not to speak at all.
These two important cases show that serious concerns exist when a disclosure
mandate threatens to chill an individual’s protected First Amendment activity. In
NAACP v. Alabama, the individuals were NAACP members who were exercising
their First Amendment rights to association; in McIntyre, it was Mrs. McIntyre

193. Id. at 462.
194. Id. at 466.
195. Id. at 460 (“Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.”).
196. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
197. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (West 1988).
198. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 338.
199. Id. at 355.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 357.
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herself who was engaged in protected First Amendment expression about an
upcoming election.
In Zauderer’s progeny, courts’ concern with controversiality, but not rightsdeterrence, reveals a potential shift in doctrine. It is significant that the effects that
concern courts are not chilling effects on speakers, but influence effects on
information recipients. Perhaps this is because the Supreme Court has characterized
the chilling effect on an organizational speaker as relatively weak. Unlike
individuals, corporations and health clinics do not feel emotions like embarrassment
or shame; they can be economically intimidated, but not physically intimidated.
Consequently, they are less likely than individuals to have their First Amendment
activity chilled by certain types of mandatory disclosure. 202 In these cases, courts’
analyses reflect a subtle post-truth concern about information’s potentially
subversive effects.
B. The Problem of Ideology
There is a second reason to question state-mandated disclosure of controversial
information: the State might mandate disclosure to advance a contested ideological
agenda.203 However, improper state motives cannot be effectively policed by treating
all information related to public debate as exempt (or nearly exempt) from compelled
disclosure. For example, a law that required anti-vaxxers to publicly disclose the
name of their health insurance companies should be constitutionally suspect, but not
because vaccines and health insurance are “controversial” subjects. 204 Instead, a
court could conclude that the State was singling anti-vaxxers out for different
treatment to embarrass them.205
It is possible, too, that the State could use disclosure to “impose its own message
in the place of individual speech, thought, and expression,” 206 or to “prescribe what

202. Cf. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6
(1980) (“[C]ommercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of
expression that is not ‘particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.’”).
Business managers do feel emotions like embarrassment and anxiety. In rare circumstances, a
company’s manager might worry that a disclosure would reflect negatively on him or her
personally, causing the manager psychological distress. However, organizations can structure
their decision-making processes to reduce the ability of managers to pursue self-interested
strategies. Because organizations can and should do this, the danger that a manager’s
individual anxiety would chill the organization’s speech is low.
203. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“Laws of this
sort pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory
goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through
coercion rather than persuasion.”).
204. If controversiality was the determining factor, the State could not mandate any
contested disclosures related to vaccines without satisfying a higher level of scrutiny.
205. See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Disclosure and Its Discontents, 27 J.L. & POL. 575, 585
(2012) (“[T]he government may not use disclosure to target particular speakers for
unfavorable treatment for engaging in protected expression.”).
206. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379
(2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.” 207
This is the problem addressed in cases like West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, which held that schools may not force school children to recite the Pledge
of Allegiance.208
By creating a lax standard of scrutiny for disclosures that it labeled “purely factual
and uncontroversial,” the Supreme Court may have really intended to preserve strict
scrutiny for disclosures that cause the speaker to affirm an ideological message.
However, “purely factual and uncontroversial” does not mean “nonideological,” and
the proliferation of post-Zauderer controversiality tests demonstrates the danger of
substituting the former for the latter. A subject becomes “controversial” when
someone controverts it, but a statement does not become “ideological” because
someone says it is. In his concurrence in NIFLA v. Becerra, Justice Kennedy wrote
that forcing crisis pregnancy centers to inform patients that state-funded abortions
are available to eligible women “compels individuals to contradict their most deeply
held beliefs.”209 This is seriously wrong. A person can speak “about” something
without endorsing it. Kennedy’s logic is not just strained; it requires enforced silence
on a range of subjects—imposing consequences only on those who, by the
misfortune of their role in our political economy, are Information Have-Nots.
Compelled ideological speech is objectionable because it gives the State an
authoritarian upper hand in political discourse and because, as Caroline Mala Corbin
puts it, it “intrude[s] upon the speaker’s autonomy and dignity.”210 Yet the autonomy
and dignity interests of organizational speakers, particularly the commercial actors
so successful at leveraging information asymmetries into profit, are—if they exist at
all—less pronounced and vital than the autonomy and dignity interests of individual
humans. Because this is true, in close cases, courts cannot justify privileging the right
of a commercial actor to not mention a subject over the rights of human actors to
experience autonomy and dignity through free and informed decision-making.
Thus, courts should care about controversiality—but only insofar as it tells them
something about the capacity of a disclosure to chill speech or to deter the exercise
of similarly important rights. The problem with the Zauderer doctrine is that it has
been interpreted in a way that divorces valid constitutional concerns about rightsdeterrence from doctrinal tests about a disclosure’s power to shape public opinion.
State action that deters the exercise of constitutional rights is a problem of
constitutional dimension; compelled disclosure of “controversial” information is not.

207. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
208. Id.
209. 138 S. Ct. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
210. Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1293 (2014);
see also id. at 1298 (“A person cannot be said to be autonomous in body if forced to speak
when she would rather stay silent. Nor is she autonomous in thought if forced to state a belief
with which she disagrees. This insult to the speaker's dignity is compounded if listeners
misattribute the government's opinion to the speaker.”).
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C. The Value of Controversial Information
There is a strong argument that “controversial” information is not at the margins
of compelled speech, but at its heart. After all, controversial information—
information that sheds light on a subject people care about—has a high value to
individuals and society.211 Courts have applied the controversial label to disclosures
related to trade in a war zone,212 health risks of glyphosate, an herbicide, 213
reproductive health services,214 radiofrequency energy exposure from cell phones, 215
allegations of labor law violations,216 the health risks of cigarettes217 and sugarsweetened beverages.218 It is precisely in debates on subjects like these that citizens
need information—and where, if information is not available, they are likely to make
choices that are self-defeating rather than self-actualizing. One could argue that
controversial information should be the easiest to compel, not the most difficult—
assuming that speaker interests and the risk of speech chilling are the same. 219
Some courts, drawing on the Alternative Facts Thesis, have suggested that
“controversial” information under Zauderer is information that might be false
because someone has contested it.220 Contestation should be a starting point,
however, not an end point. Citizens need access to contested information and to the
arguments about it to evaluate it. To conclude that contested information must be
exempt from disclosure is to capitulate to one of post-truthism’s most potent
normative arguments.

211. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)) (“[E]xpression on public issues ‘has always rested
on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’”).
212. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. (NAM 2015) v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
213. See Nat’l Ass’n of Wheat Growers v. Zeise, 309 F. Supp. 3d 842, 852 (E.D. Cal. 2018)
(“[T]he required warning for glyphosate does not appear to be factually accurate and
uncontroversial because it conveys the message that glyphosate’s carcinogenicity is an
undisputed fact when almost all other regulators have concluded that there is insufficient
evidence that [it] causes cancer.”).
214. See Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014).
215. See CTIA–Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 494 F. App’x 752, 753–54 (9th Cir.
2012).
216. See Associated Builders & Contractors of Se. Tex. v. Rung, No. 1:16-CV-425, 2016
WL 8188655 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2016).
217. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en
banc).
218. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F. (ABA 2017), 871 F.3d 884 (9th Cir.
2017).
219. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“Urgent,
important, and effective speech can be no less protected than impotent speech, lest the right to
speak be relegated to those instances when it is least needed.”). The Supreme Court “has
frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy
of First Amendment values,’ and is entitled to special protection.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 145 (1983) (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)).
220. See supra notes 151–73 and accompanying text.
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Robert C. Post has written persuasively that the “fundamental purpose” of the
First Amendment is to “protect[] the processes of opinion formation that are
necessary for democratic self-governance.”221 In political contests between
Information Haves and Have-Nots, compelled speech becomes one of the
“communicative processes” that is necessary for opinion formation. Post-truthism
offers something of a competing view—an idea of opinion formation in which whole
types of decision-making are invalid. Information-forcing laws passed by
democratically accountable legislatures should be understood as part of the
communicative processes that produce self-government. So long as disclosure
mandates do not infringe other, important constitutional interests, they reflect the
valid informational demands of an active citizenry.
The First Amendment is commonly understood to promote a robust “marketplace
of ideas” in which citizens can obtain the widest possible exposure to ideas and
information.222 In the marketplace of ideas, listeners benefit from exposure to lots of
information and arguments—the more the better. Because individual listeners will
weigh and compare conflicting claims, according to the marketplace theory, the best
ideas will rise to the top.223 Thus, in a marketplace of ideas, more facts are beneficial,
and government filtering is incompatible with an “uninhibited marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail.”224
The marketplace metaphor assumes that the “best” ideas will prevail because
citizens will prefer them, and it leaves questions about how individual citizens will
value and process information to the individual. That is, the metaphor—and the First
Amendment itself—advances no particular normative views about how individuals
should process or rely upon information. The marketplace of ideas metaphor trusts
information end users to freely and competently make use of information. It is a
challenge to the traditional marketplace metaphor to suggest, as post-truthism does,
that only certain kinds of decision-making are valid.
The notion that contested information is not trustworthy—a post-truth idea that
was described with the label the “Alternative Fact Thesis” in Part II—also conflicts
with the marketplace of ideas metaphor. The marketplace metaphor places high value

221. Post, supra note 60, at 487.
222. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (“[T]he best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”). Robert Post
disagrees that “fostering a marketplace of ideas” is a purpose or goal of the First Amendment,
“because new knowledge cannot be created without the concomitant power to judge ideas as
true or false, as better or worse.” Post, supra note 60, at 487. However, where a democratically
accountable legislature expresses the informational interests of citizens by enacting a
disclosure law, the State is not judging ideas or information; it is protecting the processes of
opinion formation.
223. See, e.g., Alvin I. Goldman & James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for
Ideas, 2 LEGAL THEORY 1 (1996).
224. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014) (quoting FCC v. League of Women
Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218,
2237 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting this language and discussing preservation of an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas as a main basis for applying strict scrutiny to content-based
speech regulation).
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on contestation, and the idea of citizens sifting and evaluating competing claims. In
the marketplace of ideas, contestation is to be expected and is a good thing; only
through robust contestation can the truth be known. 225 In contrast, post-truthism
asserts that when a fact is contested, it loses value—there is no point in engaging in
a labor-intensive process to investigate that fact because more information will only
make the inquiry murkier. Thus, the marketplace metaphor treats contestation as a
cognitive call to arms, while post-truthism views it as a reason to stand down and
wait for orders. A post-truth marketplace of ideas would bear little resemblance to
the marketplace of ideas we have been taught to revere.
Calibrating levels of scrutiny to disfavor “controversial” disclosures also invokes
dangers of governmental bias and filtering.226 And here too post-truthism offers some
insights. First Amendment law treats content-based speech restrictions with
suspicion because of the danger of government censorship or favoritism toward
particular ideas.227 As Justice Scalia once explained, content-based regulation of
speech lends itself to use for “invidious, thought-control purposes.”228 Justice Alito
has written that content-based laws “present, albeit sometimes in a subtler form, the
same dangers as laws that regulate speech based on viewpoint. Limiting speech based
on its ‘topic’ or ‘subject’ favors those who do not want to disturb the status quo. Such
regulations may interfere with democratic self-government and the search for
truth.”229
The same concerns are raised when speech is regulated on the basis of
“controversiality.” If the State limits disclosure to only noncontroversial topics, this
has the effect of favoring the status quo. In such a scenario, one of the political
branches has created an information-forcing rule precisely because the introduction
of new information is expected to do important work—to shake up the status quo, to
remedy an information asymmetry, to shed light on a problem. (Whether the
disclosure actually accomplishes these things in the end depends on the decisions of
numerous information end users, all acting autonomously, and involves no
government compulsion.) Heightened review makes it harder for the disclosure to
reach the public, and unless the heightened review is justified by other significant
constitutional interests, controversiality tests invoke the concerns expressed by
Justices Scalia and Alito.
The Supreme Court has long interpreted the First Amendment to promote the free
exchange of information, with attention to the value of information to its recipients.
The Court’s attention to informational value is premised on the view that listener

225. Although he views “participating in the formation of public opinion” as selfgovernance rather than truth-seeking, Robert Post recognizes it as “a form of communicative
action.” Post, supra note 60, at 483.
226. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231 (“[A] speech regulation is content based if the law applies
to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”).
227. See id. at 2226 (quoting Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972))
(stating that the government “has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content”).
228. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 743 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Madsen
v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 794 (1994)).
229. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring).
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interests matter: the more valuable information potentially is to its recipients, the
more significant its role in individual self-fulfillment, truth-seeking, and democratic
decision-making, and thus the higher the bar for the State to restrict the information’s
flow.230 This was the rationale for providing intermediate protection to commercial
speech, for example. Thus, when the government restricts speech, the value of the
information to its audience is part of the constitutional analysis—and not just the fact
of its value, but the degree of its value.
The Zauderer framework turns this logic on its head. By reverse calibrating the
constitutionality of a disclosure mandate to the likelihood that recipients will be
influenced or moved to action in a public dispute, it powerfully shapes the
constitutional law of information-forcing.231 Fundamentally, this is information
regulation in service to political and economic power: it is protective of the status
quo and of existing power structures that create Informational Haves and Have-Nots.
What is lurking in the background of these cases is a fear that a disclosure itself will
be destabilizing or will upset the status quo against a speaker’s interests.
V. BEYOND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Part III described how Zauderer works in cases involving commercial speech.
Through the development of legal tests that make levels of scrutiny contingent on
the “controversial” quality of information, commercial compelled speech has
become a potential vector for post-truth information regulation. Yet judicial inquiry
into the controversiality of compelled speech has not been limited to commercial
speech. In a more ad hoc development of First Amendment law, some courts have
also increased scrutiny for mandatory disclosure of “controversial” information
outside the commercial speech category. 232 Zauderer’s concern for controversiality
has begun to migrate to other compelled speech cases, where it remains true to form:
uncontroversial disclosures get more lax review, and controversial disclosures
receive a heightened form of scrutiny.
In the paragraphs that follow, I detail two such cases. In Associated Builders &
Contractors of Southeast Texas v. Rung, in 2016, a federal district court enjoined a
requirement that contractors soliciting federal government contracts publicly
disclose information about court cases, settlements, arbitrations, and administrative

230. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 5 (4th ed.
2010) (noting that the First Amendment’s protection of speech has “been thought to serve
three principal values: advancing knowledge and ‘truth’ in the ‘marketplace of ideas,’
facilitating representative democracy and self-government, and promoting individual
autonomy, self-expression and self-fulfillment”).
231. Cf. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“Urgent,
important, and effective speech can be no less protected than impotent speech, lest the right to
speak be relegated to those instances when it is least needed.”).
232. See Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., No. MJG-10760, 2016 WL 10893970, at *10, *15 (D. Md. Oct. 4, 2016) (applying strict scrutiny to a
waiting room sign because it would “introduce” a “topic” the court identified as “sensitive and
morally-laden”); see also Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509,
525–26 (6th Cir. 2012).
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merits determinations in which they were charged with violating a labor law. 233 The
court applied strict scrutiny.234 In Evergreen Association v. City of New York, in
2014, the Second Circuit held that mandatory disclosures required of crisis
pregnancy clinics violated the First Amendment, applying either intermediate or
strict scrutiny.235
In each case, although the court did not apply Zauderer, it discussed the
controversiality of the disclosure and its subversive informational effects on
recipients. In neither case did the court look for evidence that the disclosure would
have a deterrent effect on someone’s exercise of a constitutionally protected right.
The Texas federal court did not suggest that government contractors might cease
soliciting contracts if they were forced to disclose charges of labor law violations,
nor is that particularly likely. The Second Circuit did not suggest that crisis
pregnancy clinics would shut their doors if they had to post signs listing the medical
services they offer—nor would we expect them to. Both courts, however, discussed
the uses to which recipients would put the disclosure information, parsing listener
interests that, as a result of the courts’ holdings, will go unsatisfied.
A. Associated Builders & Contractors of Southeast Texas v. Rung
In late 2016, a federal court in Texas enjoined the Contractor Fair Pay Rule, a
public disclosure mandate that required contractors soliciting federal government
contracts valued at more than $500,000 to publicly disclose information about court
cases, settlements, arbitrations, and administrative merits determinations in which
they were charged with violating a labor law.236 Two things are noteworthy about the
case.
First, although the court did not apply Zauderer, its analysis focused meaningfully
on the “controversial” nature of the information to be disclosed. Citing NAM v. SEC,
the court stated that the Contractor Fair Pay Rule compelled contractors to “‘publicly
condemn’ themselves” by disclosing “controversial” information about alleged labor
law violations.237 It deemed allegations in administrative merits determinations
“certainly controversial in nature,” apparently because administrative proceedings
are adversary proceedings.238
Second, the court expressed particular concern about the potential influence of the
disclosures on recipients. The court worried that contractors subject to the disclosure

233. Associated Builders & Contractors of Se. Tex. v. Rung, No. 1:16-CV-425, 2016 WL
8188655, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2016).
234. Id. (determining that the disclosure requirement “must be preliminarily enjoined to
prevent irreparable harm to Plaintiffs’ members from compelled speech that is not narrowly
tailored to achieve any compelling government interest”).
235. Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014).
236. Associated Builders, 2016 WL 8188655, at *9.
237. Id. at *10 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (NAM 2015), 800 F.3d 518, 529 (D.C.
Cir. 2015)).
238. Id.
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mandate would be prejudiced because recipients would act on the information. 239
The court fretted that companies’
public reports of alleged violations may be used by their competitors and
adversaries to gain competitive advantage over [them] . . . [, and t]hey
will likely suffer increased costs, loss of customers, and loss of goodwill,
regardless of whether they are actually disqualified from government
contracts, by being labeled labor law violators. 240
Of course these are likely to occur—it is reasonable to assume that a range of
audiences will be influenced by information that a company has repeatedly been
accused of violating labor laws. Some of the information—disclosures about court
cases and administrative actions, for example—is a matter of public record anyway,
though this information is not routinely communicated directly by companies to
customers or employees.
The court objected that the disclosures “may prove not to be factual at all” if
subsequent judicial or administrative procedures resolved the matter in the
contractor’s favor,241 but the court’s strained interpretation of the word “factual”—
one’s status as a party in a legal or administrative proceeding is a matter of simple
fact—highlighted the court’s choice to treat the disclosures as sensitive because of
the interest they might generate. If the court’s concern were genuine, it could have
enjoined only the parts of the rule that required disclosure of violations that were not
yet finally resolved, but instead it enjoined the whole disclosure mandate. The whole
rule, it concluded, was not “factual,” and was problematically “controversial.” 242
B. Evergreen Association v. City of New York
In Evergreen Association v. City of New York, the Second Circuit addressed
mandatory disclosures by health clinics to patients.243 A New York City law
compelled certain health clinics to disclose two kinds of information about
themselves: (1) whether they had “a licensed medical provider on staff,” and (2)
whether they provided certain medical services. 244 In addition, the law required

239. Id. at *14.
240. Id.
241. Id. at *10.
242. Id. at *11.
243. 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014). The disclosure mandates applied to certain clinics
defined under the law as “pregnancy services centers,” and required disclosures to be posted
“at [the clinics’] entrances and waiting rooms, on advertisements, and during telephone
conversations.” Id. at 238. In this appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant
of a preliminary injunction of the law. Ultimately, the Second Circuit affirmed the injunction
as to two of three disclosure provisions, but held that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a
likelihood of success for one of the three disclosure provisions and vacated the injunction as
to that disclosure. Id.
244. Id. at 238. Specifically, the law required the clinics to disclose “whether or not they
‘provide or provide referrals for abortion,’ ‘emergency contraception,’ or ‘prenatal care.’” The
Second Circuit labeled this the “Services Disclosure.” Id.

1398

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:1351

disclosers to post a message: “that the New York City Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene encourages women who are or who may be pregnant to consult with a licensed
provider.”245
The City argued that the disclosure mandates were commercial disclosures and thus
subject to, at most, intermediate review under Central Hudson.246 The clinics argued that
strict scrutiny applied.247 The Second Circuit declined to decide the issue and evaluated
each type of disclosure under both strict and intermediate scrutiny.248 It held that plaintiffs
were unlikely to succeed on their First Amendment claim challenging the disclosure
about licensed medical personnel on staff, but that the other two disclosure requirements
likely violated the First Amendment.249
The court did not apply Zauderer, and it started its analysis with the conclusion
that the City’s interest in mandating the disclosures was compelling, satisfying even
strict scrutiny.250 This focused the analysis on whether the disclosures were
sufficiently tailored to the City’s interest. In its discussion of tailoring, the court
repeatedly expressed the view that the two problematic disclosures were
“controversial.” The “Services Disclosure” overburdened the clinics’ speech, the
court wrote, because it “mandates discussion of controversial political topics.”251 The
disclosure would be made in the context of “a public debate over the morality and
efficacy of contraception and abortion,” the court continued, explaining that this—
the existence of a public debate—transformed the waiting room communication into
“political” disclosure.252 The “Government Message” likewise communicated
information that was controversial, the court explained, because whether “pregnant
women should see a doctor” is “a public issue subject to dispute,” “a contested public
issue,” and a “matter[] of public concern.”253 Essentially, the Second Circuit held that
these two disclosures failed narrow tailoring in significant part because they required
the clinics to publish controversial information (i.e., information that related to a
public controversy).254

245. Id.
246. Id. at 245.
247. Id. at 244.
248. Id. at 245–51. Although the Second Circuit declined to decide whether intermediate
or strict scrutiny applied, it consistently described the disclosures as directed at “consumers”
and serving commercial purposes, which should have led it to treat them as commercial
disclosures. See, e.g., id. at 248–49. The district court had applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 246.
249. Id. at 245 (“[U]nder either level of review, the Government Message and Services
Disclosure fail review while the Status Disclosure survives.”).
250. Id. at 246. The court wrote that the City’s compelling interest was “to inform
consumers about the services they will receive from pregnancy services centers in order to
prevent delays in access to reproductive health services.” Id.
251. Id. at 250.
252. Id. at 249.
253. Id. at 250.
254. Id.
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***
What these two cases show is how easily the logic of “controversiality” testing
can migrate outside the Zauderer context. In these cases, the “controversial” nature
of the disclosures did not have the effect of chilling the disclosers’ expression, and it
did not reveal efforts by the State to advance an ideological agenda. In neither case
did the court spend much time worrying about those sorts of deprivations of speaker
rights, either. Instead, controversiality was treated as a problem itself. Yet
controversiality, standing alone, is hardly problematic. And insofar as it indicates
that listeners might be particularly interested in the information or the topic it
informs, that fact should cut in favor of disclosure, not against it.
VI. POSTSCRIPT: A GOVERNMENT-FILTERING PREFERENCE
After a court assigns a level of scrutiny to a challenged disclosure mandate, it
assesses the governmental interest and finally turns to narrow tailoring. In a handful
of cases, federal courts have suggested that to satisfy narrow-tailoring analysis, a
mandate must or should be designed so that the State itself conveys controversial
information to the public. These courts imply that speaker burdens can be reduced
by substituting the State for a private actor as the channel of private-actor disclosure
to the public—and that, at higher levels of scrutiny, the First Amendment may require
such a shift.
Although the “government-filtering preference” is mildly protective of speakers’
interests, it is deeply damaging to listener interests and to the values that sustain
democratic self-government. Thus, although few courts are currently enforcing the
preference as a matter of First Amendment law, the expression of the preference by
some courts is a major red flag about how compelled speech doctrinal mechanisms
can be co-opted to produce post-truth regulatory outcomes and to subvert core First
Amendment values.
A. Speech Restrictions and Fit
Courts commonly apply “less restrictive means analysis” to laws that limit speech.
Here, the idea is that the State should restrict as little speech as possible while
pursuing appropriate regulatory interests. 255 For strict scrutiny, narrow tailoring
requires that a speech regulation use the least restrictive means necessary to achieve

255. See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst. v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 44–45 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (en banc) (requirement that a regulation “be no more extensive than is necessary to
serve” the State’s substantial interest under intermediate scrutiny “applies not only to speech
restrictions but also to compelled speech”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible
Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2422 (1996) (“A law is
not narrowly tailored if there are less speech-restrictive means available that would serve the
interest essentially as well as would the speech restriction.”).
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a compelling governmental interest.256 Intermediate scrutiny involves a similar but
less rigorous tailoring analysis.257
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, for example, the Supreme Court threw out
tobacco advertising restrictions because they were not sufficiently tailored.258 The
Court specifically identified state-sponsored disclosure as a less restrictive means of
achieving the State’s interest—reducing tobacco use among children—observing
that “if [the State’s] concern is that tobacco advertising communicates a message
with which it disagrees, it could seek to counteract that message with ‘more speech,
not enforced silence.’”259 Essentially, the Supreme Court held that the State could
not pursue a compelling interest through the restriction of private-actor speech if the
State could achieve the same interest through its own information campaign.
Since deciding Lorillard Tobacco in 2001, the Supreme Court has not again
suggested that a law restricting a private actor’s speech may violate the First
Amendment if a state education campaign could achieve a similar informational
outcome. However, in a variation on this logic, lower courts have sometimes
invalidated a speech ban where the state interest justifying the restriction of speech
could have been achieved with a disclosure by the same speaker.260 Both Lorillard
Tobacco and these follow-on cases suggest that, where possible, disclosure laws
(including state-sponsored information campaigns) must be used instead of speech
bans to pursue a compelling governmental interest.
When the challenged law compels speech, however, the logic of these trade-offs
gets more complicated.

256. United States. v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); see also Sable
Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
257. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980) (“[I]f the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited
restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.”); Safelite Grp.,
Inc. v. Jepsen, 764 F.3d 258, 265 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City
of New York, 594 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2010)) (“‘The dictates of Central Hudson do not
require [a government] to adopt the least restrictive means of advancing its asserted interests,’
nor ‘that there be no conceivable alternative, but only that the regulation not burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate
interests.’”); Matthew D. Bunker & Emily Erickson, The Jurisprudence of Precision: Contrast
Space and Narrow Tailoring in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 259, 264–65
(2001) (describing tailoring analysis in strict and intermediate scrutiny).
258. 533 U.S. 525, 586 (2001).
259. Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
260. See, e.g., Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 96 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that advertising
ban failed narrow tailoring where the government’s interest could have been achieved by
means of disclosure); Rubenstein v. Florida Bar, 72 F. Supp. 3d 1298, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2014)
(holding that restriction on the use of past results in attorney advertising was more extensive
than necessary where “a disclaimer, or required language” could have been used).
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B. Compelled Speech and Fit
If the First Amendment sometimes requires a State to achieve an interest through
compelled speech rather than restriction of speech, does it follow that the First
Amendment sometimes requires the State to become the discloser? And what if the
disclosure information itself originated with—or must be obtained from—the private
actor? Does less restrictive means analysis require the State to take on speech
responsibilities, or to function as an information intermediary?
Some courts have essentially twisted the logic of Lorillard Tobacco to reach this
end. They assert that disclosure of certain information by the State is preferable to
mandatory disclosure of the same information by private actors, even if the time,
place, and manner of the disclosure will be different. For example, some courts have
suggested it is less restrictive for the State to operate a public awareness or
educational campaign than to force private actors to communicate the information
directly to the public.261 In 2011, a federal district court in Maryland applying strict
scrutiny threw out a crisis pregnancy clinic disclosure encouraging pregnant women
to “consult with a licensed health care provider,” asserting that a county government
must “post notices . . . in county facilities or launch a public awareness campaign”
as a less restrictive alternative.262 Yet it is not clear that a county public awareness
campaign would reach the same women who enter a private health clinic. In addition,
since the cost of a public awareness campaign might greatly exceed the cost to clinics
of posting a sign, this approach likely increased the overall societal costs of the
disclosure.
Most recently, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
requires a public information campaign instead of mandatory disclosure to satisfy
even the less rigorous tailoring analysis of intermediate scrutiny.263 In NIFLA v.
Becerra, California’s Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care,
and Transparency Act required licensed health clinics to disclose to patients that the
State offered free and low-cost reproductive health services to eligible women and
to provide a phone number to call to check for eligibility. 264 In an opinion striking
down the disclosure law on First Amendment grounds, Justice Thomas asserted that
California should have pursued its goals through a “public-information campaign”
or by “post[ing] the information on public property near crisis pregnancy centers.” 265

261. See, e.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 653 (7th Cir. 2006)
(endorsing a “broad educational campaign directed at the public” as less speech restrictive
than forcing video game manufacturers to put ratings on packages).
262. See, e.g., Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, 779 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459, 469 n.9 (D. Md.
2011) (stating that the government could “post notices encouraging women to see a doctor in
county facilities or launch a public awareness campaign” as a “less restrictive” alternative to
requiring crisis pregnancy clinics to post a sign stating “the Montgomery County Health
Officer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed health care
provider”).
263. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2377
(2018).
264. Id. at 2368.
265. Id. at 2376. It is worth noting that Justice Thomas refused to concede even that
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As it happened, California had already tried this and had concluded that it did not
work. However, the majority was unmoved. There was no evidence, Justice Thomas
wrote, that women were failing to enroll in publicly funded healthcare because they
lacked information; instead, women might not “want” the free services, or California
might have “spent insufficient resources” on the information campaign. 266 The Court
concluded that the disclosure law was not “sufficiently drawn” even under
intermediate scrutiny.267
Other courts have gone significantly further, suggesting that narrow tailoring is
not satisfied unless the State serves as an information intermediary that gathers data
from disclosers, synthesizes and analyzes the information, and channels it to the
public.268 For example, in NAM v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit threw out part of the conflict
minerals disclosure regime that required companies to disclose information, in SEC
filings and on companies’ websites, directly to the public. 269 The D.C. Circuit
suggested in dicta that Congress could have devised a “less restrictive” mandate by
requiring the government to communicate the same information to the public about
each company’s products.270 That is, the court believed that routing disclosure
information about individual companies’ products through a government filter satisfied
the First Amendment, but that forcing each company to disclose information about their
own products directly to the public did not.
The D.C. Circuit even went so far as to suggest that government-generated disclosure
may be superior to discloser-generated disclosure from a listener-focused perspective.
The court opined that “a centralized list compiled by the [SEC] in one place may even be
more convenient or trustworthy to investors and consumers.”271 This assertion—that
government-filtered speech is “more convenient or trustworthy” to recipients than
information from its original source—was as startling when it was written as it is today.
In fact, government-filtering of speech and information has long been understood as a
constitutional problem, not a solution to a constitutional problem.
Fundamentally, requiring the public to obtain information from the State reduces
the value of the information to its recipients. It hardly advances First Amendment
values to tell citizens they can obtain information from private companies, but only

“providing low-income women with information about state-sponsored services” was a
“substantial” state interest under intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 2367, 2375.
266. Id. at 2376.
267. Id. at 2375. The Court also faulted the disclosure law for being “wildly
underinclusive” because it did not require disclosures by other types of clinics that served lowincome women. Id. (citing Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011)).
268. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (NAM 2014), 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) aff’d,
800 F.3d 518 (2015); see also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988)
(observing that the First Amendment problem might be solved by requiring the discloser to
make disclosures to the State, which the State could communicate to the public).
269. NAM 2014, 748 F.3d 359.
270. Id. at 372.
271. Id. at 373; cf. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2233 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–69 (2009)) (“In
addition to regulating signs put up by private actors, government entities may also erect their
own signs consistent with the principles that allow governmental speech.”).
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so long as the government is the channel of that information, controlling both its
content and presentation. One reason is that a system in which citizens must obtain
information from a single source raises post-truth concerns. Habituating citizens to
obtain controversial information from only one source creates an informational
dependency that subverts democratic self-government.272 It encourages passivity and
groupthink.
When the exclusive source of private-sector information is the government itself,
however, additional concerns arise. The State is incentivized to shape the information
environment in ways that advantage the State, its political actors, and the campaign
finance donors who fund them; therefore, state-filtered information is likely to be viewed
by citizens as untrustworthy. Many Americans have a basic mistrust of government,
and our political culture associates propaganda strongly with state-sponsored speech.
Today, with the regulatory state under control of a presidential administration
regularly criticized for communicating false and misleading information to the
public, a government-filtering rule may go far to compromise the value of the
information. If citizens do not trust state-filtered information, the result may be no
different than if a court had simply thrown the disclosure mandate out on First
Amendment grounds. And just because citizens trust state-filtered information today
does not mean they will (or should) trust it tomorrow.
Any information system that treats the State as a primary channel of private actors’
information to other private actors gets the balance of First Amendment interests exactly
backward: an ecology of dispersed disclosers, each communicating directly with the
public, is the First Amendment ideal, even if the disclosers are under compulsion. If we
take compelled speech seriously, there are a lot of reasons to prefer an ecology of
dispersed speakers. From a speaker’s point of view, the ability to contextualize disclosure
information through additional speech is powerfully beneficial.273 From a listener’s
point of view, it is always better to obtain information from multiple independent
sources than from a single source. Importantly, a rule that produces disaggregated

272. The impulse that affirms a government-filtering preference is significantly at odds
with the view of many scholars that decentralized information production is critical to freedom
and democracy. Scholars writing about the networked information economy provide strong
arguments in favor of decentralization. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF
NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 212–72 (2006).
273. Many courts, including the Supreme Court, have written about the significant value of the
disclosers’ ability to contextualize or respond to mandatory disclosure with additional speech. See,
e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010); Meese v.
Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480–81 (1987); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977)
(stating that if consumers receive only incomplete information from attorney advertising “the
preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than less”); Conn. Bar Ass’n v. United States, 620
F.3d 81, 87, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2010); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 850 (9th
Cir. 2003) (a company subject to the challenged disclosure requirement on safe toxin disposal
was not prohibited from “stating its own views” on the subject); Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v.
Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 625 (D. Vt. 2015); The discloser’s power to respond is important
because it potentially mitigates the effects of the information on the discloser’s interests, and can do
so organically, right alongside the public disclosure. By providing additional on the spot speech, the
discloser can go far toward offsetting dignitary or reputational harms.
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disclosure from multiple speakers better respects individuals’ freedom to utilize
information as they see fit. As discussed in Part IV, a core premise of the marketplace of
ideas is that each citizen possesses the freedom to use whatever decision-making
process(es) he or she chooses. For all of these reasons, the significant informational value
of disaggregated disclosure offsets the mild First Amendment infringements experienced
by speakers in many situations.
In another recent case, two power companies challenged a Long Island town’s
ordinance requiring hazardous chemical warnings on telephone poles treated with
pentachlorophenol, a pesticide that is classified as a probable carcinogen by the
Environmental Protection Agency.274 The District Court for the Eastern District of
New York declined to treat the hazardous chemical warnings as commercial
disclosures, and the court found they did not survive strict scrutiny. 275 The reason
was that the ordinance was not the least restrictive means to educate the public about
toxic chemicals in telephone poles.276 “[T]he parties apparently agree,” the court
wrote, “that the Town is free to create, distribute, and display at its own expense the
exact same warning signs contemplated [in the ordinance] on any and all Town
property. . . .”277 The court failed to note, however, that the warnings told readers to
“avoid prolonged direct contact with this pole” and to “wash hands or other exposed
areas thoroughly if contact is made”—a warning that was significantly diminished if
it was removed from the poles.278 In other words, the Town could pay to post its own
warning signs, but these would likely be less effective at achieving the Town’s
interest: helping residents protect their health from exposure to carcinogens.
The court’s decision to throw out the hazardous chemical warnings on First
Amendment grounds illustrated how the government-filtering preference shifts
information costs from a private actor to the State.279 However, it also increases overall
disclosure costs. For example, in the case of the conflict minerals disclosure in NAM v.
SEC, the D.C. Circuit suggested that the SEC should collect, synthesize, and publish
information from numerous companies, which presumably would require it to maintain
and update one or more reports over time.280 This barely saves the companies any
money—after all, the companies must still go through a disclosure exercise—but it
creates meaningful new and ongoing costs for the SEC. Moreover, by creating new costs

274. PSEG Long Island LLC v. Town of North Hempstead, 158 F. Supp. 3d 149, 153–55,
157 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). The ordinance required the warning to be posted on every fourth pole.
275. Id. at 164, 167–68 (“[T]he warning signs bear no discernible relationship to the
Plaintiffs’ products, services, or other commercial interests, and are therefore outside the
purview of the commercial speech doctrine.”).
276. Id. at 167–69.
277. Id. at 168.
278. Id. at 157. The full warning message stated: “NOTICE—THIS POLE CONTAINS A
HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL. AVOID PROLONGED DIRECT CONTACT WITH THIS
POLE. WASH HANDS OR OTHER EXPOSED AREAS THOROUGHLY IF CONTACT IS
MADE.” Id.
279. See Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC, 315 P.3d 71, 105 (Cal. 2013)
(Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting the cost-shifting effect of mandatory
disclosure).
280. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (NAM 2014), 748 F.3d 359, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2014), aff’d,
800 F.3d 518 (2015).
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for the State, the approach also increases the political costs of disclosure. In some cases,
government-filtered disclosure may be cost prohibitive for the State, even though it
probably would not be cost prohibitive for individual disclosers assuming the pro
rata costs associated with their own activity. This means that useful disclosure
information will never reach the public. More generally, as the costs of a disclosure
mandate rise, the benefits necessary to justify the costs also rise. Particularly where
a disclosure’s benefits are intangible or difficult to quantify, such as disclosure of
information that advances democratic decision-making rather than consumer choice,
a government-filtering preference may discourage regulators from using disclosure
as a regulatory tool at all.
This is not meant to suggest that a government-filtering preference has taken hold
in courts across the United States. It has not. However, one thing is clear: at the less
restrictive means step of First Amendment analysis, some courts are willing to trade
away core First Amendment interests to reduce burdens on private speakers. We
should recognize this as post-truth because its widespread adoption would compress
the information economy, make the State the exclusive source of citizen information
on a range of important subjects, discourage individual truth-seeking and democratic
self-determination, and limit the availability of information that is important to
people for a range of purposes. Courts should reject the government-filtering
preference as fundamentally undemocratic.
VII. CONCLUSION
James Madison once wrote that “[a] popular Government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy;
or, perhaps both.”281 Madison’s words, and his recognition that democracy requires
citizens to wield information-forcing tools, have stood the test of time.
Pundits will almost certainly continue to argue about post-truthism. Is posttruthism a side product of the internet, a potent antidemocratic tribalism, or the end
of our commitment to rationality? Whatever post-truthism is as a political
phenomenon, it is most potent as a constitutional problem when First Amendment
doctrine calibrates information flows in relation to the disruptive uses to which
citizens may put information.
In other words, post-truthism matters in law insofar as constitutional value
judgments about decision-making shape the flow of information to end users in ways
that reinforce informational power structures. In earlier eras, censorship and speech
bans raised serious concerns that we could recognize as implicating post-truth
concerns. Such restrictions threatened to create information gaps and to silence
particular channels of information, making evidence-based reasoning more difficult
and costly. In the current information age, the evolving law of compelled speech
poses a new set of post-truth problems for law.
This Article has shown that courts’ use of controversiality tests tends to reverse
calibrate information regulation to disclosure’s informative function: the more recipients
would value the information in the exercise of their citizenship (i.e., in resolving a matter

281. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 690 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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subject to public debate), the more likely the First Amendment will prevent the
information’s disclosure. Zauderer sets the constitutional bar higher for information that
recipients are likely to value highly and sets the constitutional bar lower for information
that recipients are likely to care little about. It gets the First Amendment interests exactly
backward.
There are real reasons why the First Amendment might care about whether
information subject to mandatory disclosure is controversial. One reason is that forcing
certain kinds of speakers to disclose certain kinds of information can lead to reprisal and
retaliation against speakers, which might deter speakers’ exercise of constitutional rights
and interests. Another reason is that, in some cases, the State might use (and has used)
compelled speech to force speakers to affirm an ideological viewpoint. Since it is true
that ideological viewpoints tend to be controversial, courts might use (and have used)
controversiality testing as an overbroad way to quash viewpoint discrimination.
The First Amendment’s overarching concern is to encourage the free flow of
information on matters of public debate. It is time to consider how information-forcing
fits into this scheme and to define limiting principles that promote, and do not undermine,
democracy.

